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Introduction
In early June 2017 at 8 a.m. a train hit a tree that was chopped down over the tracks in a central
region of the Czech Republic. Police investigators found fliers at the scene with messages
related to Islam. Nobody was hurt during the incident (Němcová and Heroldová 2017). In
February 2019 a 71-year-old Czech man was sentenced on charges of terrorism. During the
court hearing, he stated that he had nightmares about trains overcrowded with Muslim migrants
coming to the Czech Republic in order to rape women (ČT24 2019). His action was motivated
by an attempt to mobilise the public against Islam. This 71-year-old sympathiser of a Czech
anti-immigration and anti-Islamic political party SPD became the first convicted terrorist in
the Czech Republic (Aktualne.cz 2019).
On March 15, 2019, almost 50 worshippers were killed in an attack on two mosques in
Christchurch, New Zealand. Social networks and comment sections on news websites began to
fill with comments that can be defined as hate speech or approval of terrorism. Czech Police
started investigating some of the comments, the Minister of Interior issued a statement saying
that this kind of behaviour will not be tolerated (ČTK 2019; Karlík and Kubištová 2019). The
comments on both social networks and news websites were widespread. Among them, one
could have read statements such as “I would give [the attacker] a medal, more of those who
don’t just speak but act. He’s badass; say whatever you want.”; “No Muslims, no mosques, no
problem”; “Finally someone started and gave an example not to be afraid to use the same means,
he who sows the wind reaps the whirlwind.”; “When Muslims are allowed to murder, I don’t
see a single reason why we shouldn’t pay back!!!! I don’t see what’s all this fuzz about.”
(Romea.cz 2019; Brodcová and Golis 2019).
The Muslim population in the Czech Republic is about 0,2 % of the total population (Pew
Research Center 2017). The number of immigrants per inhabitant is meagre in the Czech
Republic, about 4,9 immigrants per 1000 natives. The Czech Republic is the country with 5th
lowest concentration of immigrants per native in Europe (Eurostat 2019). Similarly, the number
of asylum seekers is marginal compared to previous decades (see Graph 1).
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Graph 1 – Development of the number of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international
protection in the Czech Republic

Source: (People in Need 2017, 2)
Even though both Muslims and migrants from Muslim countries are few in total numbers, the
public seems to treat migration as one of the vital social topics. According to a survey, in Czech
presidential elections in 2018, immigration was seen as the second most crucial issue. In a
public survey, over 45 % of respondents said it is one of the two most important issues the
country is currently facing, while the European average was slightly over 35 % (Dražanová
2018).
Given the fact that there are no substantial numbers of immigrants or asylum seekers either
living or entering the Czech Republic, it has been proved in the abovementioned studies and
surveys that anti-migrant and anti-Islamic stance has been one of the critical factors shaping the
public interest. This thesis aims to look into the phenomenon that could be labelled as a
migration crisis without migrants. The research is focused on securitization, which means
classifying a specific issue (in this case, migration) as a threat (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998).
When asked about how people feel about immigration from outside the EU, Czechs have seen
the migration from outside of EU, in general, more negatively, than the EU average, as the
following graphs show:
Graph 2: The Czech Republic
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Graph 3: The European Union
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Source: (European Commission 2018), graphs by author
These data clearly show that the negative approach to outside-EU migration is significantly
higher in the Czech Republic when compared to the EU average. The negative approach to
migration is apparent already in late 2014 before the so-called migration crisis1 even begun.
The Eurobarometer does not offer the option of selecting a specific region of origin. Thus, it
can be argued that the graphs above do not necessarily express the public opinion on migrants
1

The term migration crisis refers to the events of mainly the year 2015 when large number of people migrated to
Europe. These people, mainly from Africa and the Middle East used several migration routes, both via Balkan
countries and the Mediterranean Sea. Many of the mainstream media as well as international institutions started
calling this event migration crisis, supporting the notion of migrant-related threat (see The Economist 2019; BBC
2015).
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from the Middle East and North Africa. The Eurobarometer was used in order to illustrate the
results of surveys in the Czech Republic and compare these with the EU average levels. This
comparison is naturally possible only when using surveys done by the same methods; in another
case, the comparison would be questionable.
In the Czech Republic, there are reports published by the Public Opinion Research Centre which
are asking specifically about migrants from the Middle East and North Africa. According to
their surveys conducted since September 2015, the refusal towards accepting migrants from the
Middle East and North Africa corresponds with the data from Eurobarometer. The participants
were asked if they agree with the following statement: the Czech Republic should accept some
of the migrants coming from the Middle East and North Africa.
Graph 4: The Czech Republic should admit some of the migrants coming from the Middle East
and North Africa. (in %)

Source: (Hanzlová 2019b, 6)
This graph itself does not, however, show the securitization of migration. Disagreeing with
admitting migrants from the Middle East and North Africa might be from various reasons and
only disagreeing with the admittance based on security-related issues would show that
migration is securitized among the population. For that reason, I will present another graph. In
this case, the respondents were asked: “Is or is not the current situation regarding refugees a
threat to the safety of a) the Czech Republic b) Europe c) world peace? Possible answers:
definitely yes, rather yes, rather no, definitely no.
Graph 5: Refugees as a security threat, May 2019
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Source: (Hanzlová 2019b, 3)
Based on this graph, it is evident that a large percentage of the Czech population sees refugees
as a security risk, mainly to European security. It is, however, difficult to establish a causality
relationship between graphs 4 and 5 as it is not clear if people refuse migration because they
feel it is a security threat, or from a different reason. The report made by Public Opinion
Research Centre does, however, mentions the following: “(…) against admitting refugees are
in general much more frequently and strongly those, who deem refugees to be a security threat.”
(Hanzlová 2019b, 6). In other words, the refusal of admitting refugees is caused by seeing them
as a security threat – this is the consequence of securitization of migration.
Given the fact that the number of migrants arriving in Europe keeps decreasing since it peaked
in 2015 at 1,032,400 arrivals to Europe to 141,500 in 2018 (UNHCR 2018), we do not observe
a decrease in negative feelings about accepting migrants from outside Europe. On the contrary,
as this thesis aims to point out, there is an increased securitization of migration – seeing
migration and migrants as a threat to security – a speech act conducted (not only) by political
parties.
This relation between decreasing numbers of migrants coming from outside the EU, especially
from the Middle East and North Africa, does not correlate with the level of anti-migrant rhetoric
in many European countries. As shown in the graphs above, countries with almost no migration
from the Middle East and North Africa are significantly above the European average of refusing
migration. This thesis aims to offer an explanation of the phenomenon of securitization of
migration, shown on a specific example of the election to the European Parliament in the Czech
Republic in May 2019. Even when focusing on a specific and relatively small country, there is
potential for generalization of the results, given the similar attitudes towards migration of other
East-European countries, mainly the Visegrad Group countries.
8

The research puzzle of this thesis is the issue of securitization of migration – how is it effective
and what means are used in order to securitize migration. Given the fact that the number of
migrants coming to the Czech Republic from the Middle East and North Africa is close to zero,
migration from these countries is a rather important topic in the election. This thesis focuses on
the process of labelling this migration as a threat by political actors. It aims to explain how is
the migration securitized, what means are used, and what are the specific aspects of the
securitization process. The hypothesis claims that migration was in no small extent securitized
by political parties in their election manifestos, by using means of negative framing of
migration, exaggerating the threats associated with migration and creating the notion of threat
stemming from migration.
The introduction, which also serves as a chapter on the general context of the researched
phenomenon, is followed by a literature review and methodology. The goal of these two
chapters is to briefly recapitulate the current state of research of the subject as well as to explain
the methods used to conduct the research in this thesis. The methodology chapter is partially
devoted to the theory of securitization, which is the main element of the research. The next
chapter, Objectives and research questions state the goals of this thesis. After this, the following
chapters look at the objects of this research – the atmosphere in the society, with an accent on
the roots of Islamophobia and its current presence among the Czech public, followed by a
chapter on the securitizing actors – the political parties selected for this research. Both the
chapter on parties and fear aim to illustrate the relation between the context and the actors
because as explained further on, these two parts of the process are interconnected.
Next chapter focuses on the referent object, another essential factor of the securitization theory.
This chapter examines what is actually threatened and needs protection. This chapter is
followed by chapters on Speaking security and Hearing security. The first one focuses on the
content analysis on several levels, whereas the second chapter looks into the audience and its
perception of the securitization process.
The results of content analysis, as well as their interpretation and summary, is reviewed in
chapter called Migration crisis without migrants. This chapter offers answers to research
questions and objectives. The thesis ends with a conclusion, which offers a brief summary of
the topic in general and identifies the main trends and outcomes.
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1 Literature review
This literature review focuses on the current state of the literature regarding the topic of this
thesis. It reviews the main studies conducted in the recent period, which are relevant due to the
geographic area, theoretical framework or chosen approach. This chapter is not a complete list
of all relevant publications. It aims at providing a clear overview of current trends in political
science and migration studies, regarding the securitization of migration. The below-mentioned
articles could be divided into two categories – theories and case studies. This literature review
serves as a chronological guide through the development of the theory of securitization and its
application. This chapter, however, does not explore the theory of securitization into depth, as
this is the aim of the next chapter on theories.
The key theory of securitization, which is the central theory of this thesis, was firstly developed
by the representatives of Copenhagen School (CS) in the 1990s. In their book Security: A New
Framework for Analysis, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde explain the changes in
the concept of security as well as in the process of securitization (see Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde
1998). This has later become a starting point for many researchers and scholars who based on
the theory of securitization further developed and modified theoretical frameworks (Huysmans
2011; Balzacq 2005); or used the theory in their case studies (see Zvada 2018; Miholjcic 2017).
The CS developed a multi-dimensional understanding of security. In the Cold War period,
security was mainly seen as a military threat caused by the clearly identified perpetrator –
usually another state. With the conceptual framework developed by CS, the term security
shifted from its original military hard security towards understanding security from various
points of view – such as societal, environmental, political or economic security. The “enemy”
was no longer a state, but anything that was labelled as such a threat, regardless of the actual
existence of risk (see Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998).
The literature that followed up on the CS theories and concept is rather large, yet two authors
specifically are worth pointing out, both of them focusing on a different interpretation of
securitization.
Firstly, Jef Huysmans (2011, 375–76) focuses on securitization as an act of speech – with
emphasis on the act. According to Huysmans, the audience’s acceptance of the speech act of
security is not an issue. The issue is creating the scene, regardless of the institutionalization or
acceptance. The key concept here is the authority and what the author calls little security
10

nothings – practices, devices, sites that by themselves have no significant value, but the way
they serve as symbols of threat, these nothings are more potent than speech acts in starting the
securitization process. Huysmans gives many examples of these nothings, such as the CCTV,
credit cards or even fertilizers (due to their potential use in bomb-making).
Secondly, Thierry Balzacq puts the audience into the centre of securitization. Unlike Huysmans,
Balzacq sees the success of securitization in the fact that it needs to be audience-centred, used
under specific conditions (context) and oriented on gaining political mandate (agency) (see
Balzacq 2005). The theory of Balzacq, which incorporates three conditions for the success of
securitization offers more insight into the communication element of securitization, seeing it as
a two-way process between the actor and the audience. The three-dimensional approach also
allows for systematic analysis of the researched phenomena.
The main difference between Balzacq and Huysmans is the level of audience engagement.
Whereas according to Huysmans, the speech act does not need to be accepted; it merely creates
a scene which may start the process of securitization. Balzacq, on the other hand, focuses on
context, the audience and the message. These two approaches clearly represent the current
divide in academia, the number of interpretations of CS theories as well as the rapid
development in security studies since the end of the Cold War.
Regardless of the confusion in the interpretation of the theories, there are many case studies
using the theory of securitization, either in its original form, or slightly modified. Below are
reviewed a few of these case studies which are relevant to the research due to their topic and
geographical focus on the region of Central and Eastern Europe, mainly the Visegrad Group
Countries.
Firstly, there is at the moment no research available on securitization on migration in any Czech
elections. From this point of view is this thesis unique. There are, however, studies on the
securitization of migration in Slovakia and Hungary (see Zvada 2018; Goździak and Márton
2018; Miholjcic 2017; Štampach 2017). There are of course studies on the securitization of
migration in many other countries and historical periods, but the cases of Slovakia and Hungary
are very relevant due to cultural, historical and in Slovakian case language similarities. These
countries are also members of the Visegrad group, which, as a platform, has a unified approach
to migration policies of the EU.
The Slovakian case is researched in Ľubomír Zvada’s article “Securitization of the Migration
Crisis and Islamophobic Rhetoric: The 2016 Slovak Parliamentary Elections as a Case Study”.
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In this study, the author applies the theory of securitization on the case of Slovakian
Parliamentary Elections in 2016, which is very interesting from the contextual point of view,
since in 2015 the so-called migration crisis peaked in Europe. The author concludes that the
securitization of migration took place in some of the parties, and it was used as a central theme
of their campaigns. The author also noticed increased levels of xenophobia and Islamophobia
(Zvada 2018). Zvada bases his research on the original, unmodified CS theory of securitization,
and while he discusses the questionable Slovak identity, he ignores the audience. Zvada’s focus
was thus put on the content of the message, rather than on the interaction between the actors
and their audience.
The second study on Hungary, by Nina Miholjcic, has more solid theoretical fundaments. She
bases her case study on the extended theory of securitization by one of the founders of CS, Ole
Waever. In her case, there are clear conditions for the success of securitization – (1) presenting
the issue as an existential threat, (2) authority to persuade the audience and (3) historical
background (Miholjcic 2017, 60–61). The author focuses on the speech acts conducted by
mainly Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and concludes that securitization of migration
in Hungary was successful, migrants are seen as an existential threat and the success of
securitization allowed for extraordinary measures – building the wall on the border with Serbia.
The selected case studies focus on the content of the message, and whether it is the Prime
Minister’s speech or political parties’ campaigns; securitization is measured in words. While
this is an integral part of the analysis and will be part of this thesis, too, there are other relevant
dimensions that need to be analysed – the context and the audience.
This literature review provided a brief overview of the development of the theory of
securitization and outlined two of the significant following scholar approaches. By reviewing
the geographically relevant case studies, it has been shown that securitization of migration has
been researched in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, however not in the Czech
Republic. The case studies also used the CS theory of securitization as their framework for
analysis, but both the case of Slovakia and Hungary did not use its full potential which is
represented by exploring the two-way communication between the securitizing actor and the
audience.
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2 Methodology
This chapter explains the way in which I intend to address the questions raised by the abovedefined research problems. It aims to describe the way how using two different methods will
help to answer the research questions. Furthermore, this chapter introduces the theory and
conceptual frameworks used in the master thesis. First, the qualitative deductive content
analysis is explained, followed by a sub-chapter dealing with the disciplined interpretive case
study, concluding with a brief overview of the theories and conceptual frameworks used in the
proposed thesis.
Before proceeding to the specific methods, it is necessary to clarify the sample selection. It is
necessary to reduce the number of parties analysed in this research. There are 39 candidate
parties in the Czech Republic (Programy do Voleb 2019j). Whereas some of them are singleissue parties or even parody parties, the others are long-established parties with parliament
representation and previous experience with the European parliament. The parties take into
account will be those which are either currently represented in the Czech parliament2 and/or
those represented in the European Parliament during the 2014-2019 term. According to the
currently proposed key, out of the total 39 candidate parties, 10 parties are represented in the
national parliament and/or the European Parliament, while two of them form a coalition, so in
total 9 political subjects will be analysed.

2.1 Qualitative Content Analysis
Whereas content analysis is used often in order to analyse party manifestos, the more frequently
used content analysis is quantitative, which focuses merely on the frequency of certain words
or phrases used in a written or spoken document and based on this frequency it establishes the
importance of the various topic for the given actor (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1283).
This thesis is concerned only with a limited set of expressions – those connected to migration.
While classical content analysis will be included, it is not sufficient to research the phenomenon
of securitization. Firstly, the content analysis will focus on the context – such as in what
chapters is migration issue mentioned. Further, alongside which other issues is migration

2

In Czech Republic, the parliament is bicameral and only the lower chamber is taken into consideration. The upper
chamber – the Senate – is elected by majoritarian voting system and is more personality than party based.
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mentioned – for example, if migration is part of a chapter devoted to employment, it is not
securitizing, while migration mentioned in chapters on security is.
The second level of analysis is looking at the attributes. If the term migration is used with
attributes such as overwhelming, dangerous, illegal, or wave of migrants, invasion of migrants
etc. it can be established that these attributes contribute to the securitization narrative on
migration.
The third level is looking at the individual securitizing statements. These will be quoted
individually, party by party. Among these, the standard features and reoccurring expressions
will be identified.
It is not, however, only the securitization itself which is researched by content analysis. The
referent object – an expression used in the securitization theory – can also be identified using
the content analysis. Referent object is an entity that needs to be protected and is threatened (or
is claimed to be threatened). Referent object can be state, the EU, borders, culture etc. A
separate chapter is devoted to identifying the most common referent object, using the content
analysis.
Qualitative content analysis is used in this thesis to discover the various levels of securitization,
from the contextual level to the level of statements. The contextual level is crucial because not
all securitizing messages are contained directly in the statements (Hsieh and Shannon 2005,
1285; Balzacq 2005, 173). The statements level is also significant because it shows directly
what is the message of the securitizing actors (the political parties), what kind of images are
used as well as what kind of language and rhetoric is present in securitizing statements
(Huysmans 2011, 372).

2.2 Disciplined interpretive case study
This method was invented by John S Odell, and it serves to explain or interpret phenomena
using an existing theory. It is not primarily seen as a test of said theory, rather than the use of
existing theory as a framework. Odell mentions that combination with other methods is useful
as one method can point out the specific issues, and the disciplined interpretive case study
would look more deeply into the details (Odell 2001). The case study is therefore to a more
considerable extent dependent on the theory itself, and while the content analysis described
above will prepare the ground, the interpretive case study will go into greater depths using the
theory of securitization as an explanatory framework.
14

2.3 Securitization - theory and conceptual framework
The underlying theory of the proposed research is the theory of securitization by the CS. The
basic outline of this theory, formulated in 1998 is: “issue becomes a security issue not
necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is presented as such a
threat.” (…) “issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” (…)
”Successful securitization is not decided by the securitized but by the audience of the security
speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value?”
(Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, 24–25, 31) Securitization in the context of this thesis does
not mean hard security such as border fences, patrols or checkpoints. Securitization is an act of
speech.
At this point, given the facts presented in the previous chapter, it would be possible to conclude
the research by saying that the securitization was successful, most of the people see migration
(especially from the Middle East as a security risk), and there are those who even undertake
violent actions against migrants or celebrate those who do. This thesis, however, looks into how
did the issue of migration become so widely securitized, especially in a country with meagre
migration rates.
In order to explain this, a theory by Thierry Balzacq is used as a framework for analysis. Balzacq
follows up on Buzan et al. and the CS theory of securitization. The original theory of the CS
establishes three categories objects for analysis – the referent object (what is to be
protected/endangered), the securitizing actor (who labels a phenomenon as a threat) and the
functional actors (those, who are crucial for ensuring security) (Balzacq 2005, 178). As the
author notices, the original CS did not pay any attention to the audience, yet if the process of
labelling something as a threat is to succeed, it needs to be received by the targeted public. Also,
context plays a rather important role. Balzacq sees the weakness of the CS theory on
securitization by leaving the two critical factors – audience and context and suggests a modified
theory of securitization (Ibid.).
Securitization, according to Balzacq, is:


Context-dependent



Audience centred



Power laden (agency)
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(Balzacq 2005)
In order to use these three levels of securitization, the following paragraphs conceptualize each
of the levels so that they can be analysed on the presented case of the election campaign.
Firstly, the level of contextual dependency is explained by Balzacq in the following way: “to
win an audience, security statements must, usually, be related to an external reality. (…) Hence
success (…) rests with whether the historical conjuncture renders the audience more sensitive
to its vulnerability.” (Balzacq 2005, 182) In the case of migration, important contextual factors
are, for example, media narratives and the general consensus on the label “migration crisis”.
Migration via the Mediterranean Sea as well as through Balkan countries has been often
displayed as an invasion. Specifically, the context in which securitization takes place in the
Czech Republic is well illustrated by the statistics in the Introduction chapter of this thesis. It
has been shown that a vast majority of the population sees migration as an undesired
phenomenon as well as a threat, even though there is almost no immigration from the MENA
region to the Czech Republic. The conjuncture, using Balzacq’s terminology, is therefore in
favour of securitization of migration and can be labelled as fear of migration. Further, this will
be discussed in the chapter on Islamophobia. To sum up the contextual level of securitization
analysis, it encompasses the atmosphere in the society, the historical experience and perception
of the current security situation – an umbrella term for these factors is Zeitgeist.
The second level of analysis is the assumption that securitization is audience centred. According
to Balzaq, “(…) the success of securitization is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor’s
ability to identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests.” (Balzacq 2005, 184).
According to the theory, it is necessary to adopt a suitable language, gestures, images and
attitudes in order to connect with the audience (Ibid.). This means that in order for securitization
to be successful, the securitizing actor, in this context the political party, needs to know the
audience and adopt a language and form which is comprehensible by the audience and creates
a feeling of mutual acknowledgement, feeling that the political actor is adherent to the crowd.
According to the research conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre, in general, those
interested in politics, favouring the right-wing parties and with a good livelihood are more open
to accepting refugees from the MENA region. Those who are against accepting the MENA
refugees frequently view refugees in general as a threat (Hanzlová 2019b, 6). From this
statistical data, it can be assumed that those political actors who aim for the securitization of
migration attract people who are dissatisfied with their livelihood and not interested in politics.
16

It can be therefore expected to observe more focus on anti-migration rhetoric in cases of
populist, anti-system parties who appeal to those social groups who feel underprivileged.
The third level of analysis is the agency. Agency is “the capacity of the securitizing actor to use
words and cogent frames of reference in a given context, in order to win the support of the
target audience for political purposes.” (Balzacq 2005, 192). The speech act of securitization
needs to be power-laden. In this case, the securitization is successful in case the audience is
willing to give the actor a political mandate – a vote.
To briefly summarize the three levels of securitization by Balzacq, as they apply for this thesis:
In order for the securitization of migration to be successful, it needs to be:


Tailored to the historical context and social atmosphere (Islamophobia)



Identified with the target audience (dissatisfaction with the current status)



Leading to gaining support for political purposes (mobilizing the electorate)

Process of securitization, as introduced by the CS and further developed by other authors,
including Balzacq, has several important parts. Firstly, the securitizing actor, which is, in this
case, the political party. The second element is the referent object, which can be either very
specific – such as the border, or very abstract, such as culture or identity. The securitized issue
is then migration. It is essential to realize that securitized issue might or might not be an actual
threat, as long as it is presented as one.
The securitizing actor starts with an issue which they consider to be important. In their
statements, the securitizing actor describes the issue as a threat to the audience. In order for the
audience to believe the securitizing actor, the language of the statement needs to be
comprehensible by the audience. The circumstances under which this process takes place must
also be taken into consideration. By using the right language and making the most of the
contextual conditions, the securitizing actor can persuade the audience that an issue is a threat
and thus gain political support via election.
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3 Objectives and research questions
The following chapter discusses the objectives of the proposed thesis as well as research
questions and hypotheses related to the research problem. Given the mix of methods used, it
has been mentioned above that different methods are used to achieve different goals.

3.1 Research questions and hypotheses
Numerous scholars and researchers agree that migration is nowadays, especially in the Central
and Eastern European region, a securitized issue. Therefore, this thesis does not focus on just
securitization. Instead, using Balzacq’s theory, it aims at researching the success of
securitization as well as its layers. These layers are identical to Balzacq’s dimensions of
securitization analysis – audience, context and agency.
The general question is, therefore:
Q1: In the cases of selected relevant political parties, was securitization of migration in their
parties manifestos for the European Parliament Election of May 2019 effective, using what
means?
The efficiency of securitization is based on three factors, as mentioned earlier. Therefore,
research sub-questions are necessary.
Q1a: To what extent was the securitization process adjusted to a contextual frame?
The contextual frame is what Balzacq defines as “relevant aspects of the Zeitgeist that influence
the listener, and the impact of the immediate situation on the way the securitizing author’s
sentences are interpreted by the listener.” (Balzacq 2005, 192) It is the current atmosphere in
the society concerning migration. The Zeitgeist is created by both the securitizing actors, but
also by history, culture, mindset, prejudice etc. It is basically the environment, which in order
for securitization to be successful, needs to offer favourable conditions for securitization.
Q1b: To what extent was the securitization of migration audience-centred?
The second condition is identification with the audience, using language that would allow the
audience to identify with the securitization statements (Balzacq 2005, 184). Identification might
be based on shared values, interests as well as problems and worries. Securitizing agents need
to be understood, and for this understanding, they need to use an audience centred approach.
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Q1c: Were the securitizing actors able to use their rhetoric in order to win the support of the
target audience for political purposes?
The third sub-question deals with the granting of a political mandate. It asks whether the
securitization speech act in the manifestos was powerful enough to make people vote for
securitizing parties. This question proves to be the most difficult one to provide evidence as
there is no way of proving causality between securitization and voter’s behaviour. In order to
establish a link, correlation is necessary between securitization and election results. At the time
of writing this thesis, there is no research which would prove direct causality. The role of the
other two factors of context and audience is, however, to be likely to strengthen the correlation.
The hypotheses regarding previous research questions are:
H1: Majority of selected parties managed to securitize migration effectively, using means of
negative images and contextual framework, creating a notion of threat and general
endangerment.
H1a: The contextual frame, shaped by the media image of migration crisis combined with other
factors such as history, Islamophobia, lack of knowledge on migration issues and general dislike
of Arabs, created conditions favourable for the securitization of migration.
H1b: The securitizing actors used language and images which strongly resonated with specific
groups of the society. The actors used the feeling of being left behind, vulnerability and general
disappointment of the post-communist development to create a sense of need for protection.
This increased the securitization potential for the intended target groups of the audience.
H1c: Whereas it is impossible to establish a clear link between securitization and voting for the
securitizing actor, most of the parties used powerful images of threat from the outside, while
portraying themselves as protectors of the way of life. For many parties, this was even presented
in their mottos. While securitization of migration way probably not the only reason for electing
securitizing parties, the image of the party as a protective shield from the external danger played
a significant role.
While the previous questions require content analysis on several levels as well as using a
securitization theory as a framework, the answers to the questions will say very little about the
content of the securitization message. Since the content analysis will be conducted for the
purpose of these questions, it is also necessary to look at the message of securitizing statement.
Therefore, the additional research question is:
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Q2: What was the message contained in the statements which were identified as securitizing
migration?
H2: It is expected that securitizing statements contain images of dangerous migrants or portray
migration as a deviant phenomenon which needs to be stopped. Migration, in general, is
qualified as a negative phenomenon which poses a security risk to both the Czech Republic and
Europe. Migration is mentioned often in the context of illegal issues such as transnational crime
or terrorism. In extreme cases, migration is directly associated with terrorism, rapes and the
images of millions of people trying to get to Europe at any cost.

3.2 Objectives
The main objective is to assess the role of securitization of migration in the EU election in the
Czech Republic. The research aims to explain and show on specific cases how does
securitization work, how does it resonate with the audience, with the contextual realm and how
effective is securitization as a speech act in granting support for political purposes. After these
three dimensions are analysed, it can be decided whether the securitization of migration was or
was not successful. The added value of this research is not, however, to merely claim that there
was or was not a securitization and if it was or was not successful. By incorporating Balzacq’s
theory of three dimensions of securitization as an analytical framework, this research goes into
depth of the process of securitization. It does not preoccupy itself only with the actor or the
referential object, as many classical securitization researchers do, but it puts an accent on the
dynamic and connection between the securitizing actor and the audience, seeing it as a two-way
street.
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4 Immigration as a threat
It is somewhat problematic to generalize and say that migration and migrants are by a large
portion of the public in the Czech Republic seen as a threat. Like any other country, the Czech
Republic is not placed in a vacuum, and there were significant migration waves prior to the
2015 situation. This chapter focuses on differences of perceiving different groups of migrants
at different stages of Czech history, with an evident focus on immigration from the MENA
region. Further on, the chapter introduces the concept of Islamophobia as an essential
theoretical tool for understanding the current state of securitization of migration. The goal of
this chapter is to attempt to answer the question of why is migration from dominantly Islamic
countries seen as a threat. To answer this, it is necessary to look at the possible historical roots
of Islamophobia.

4.1 Fear of whom?
As explained in the chapter on the theory of securitization, in order for securitization to take
place, the securitizing actor (in this case the political party or its leader) need to successfully
use the atmosphere in the society in order to persuade it that a particular phenomenon is a threat.
To achieve that, fear plays a significant role. This subchapter elaborates on what exactly is
causing this emotion and why fear of foreigners does not apply equally to different national
minorities.

4.1.1 Different minorities, different attitudes
Looking at the Public Opinion Research Centre’s data, it is possible to compare relations of
Czechs towards different minorities. The table and graph below illustrate both the likeability
and its development through time. The respondents were asked to assign a grade 1-5 to each of
the group, 1 being the most likeable, 5 being the most unlikeable.
Table 1: Average grade assigned to a group, March 2019
Nationality
Czechs
Slovaks
Poles
Greeks
Hungarians
Vietnamese

Grade
1,68
1,8
2,65
2,66
2,72
2,78

21

Jews
Germans
Bulgarians
Russians
Chinese
Serbs
Ukrainians
Romanians
Albanians
Roma
Arabs

2,8
2,86
2,88
3,05
3,13
3,15
3,25
3,44
3,67
3,96
4,1

Source: (Tuček 2019, 2), colour scale by author
Graph 6: Development of likeability of selected national groups
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The research does not differentiate between various countries of origins in case of the category
Arabs, which might be an indication that Arabs are viewed as a monolithic ethnic group, and
very little attention is paid to whether a person is from e.g. Iraq or Egypt. The author of the
research, Milan Tuček (2019), notices, that in most categories, the development is minimal,
except for the relation towards Arabs and the Vietnamese. Since 2014 the attitude towards
Arabs deteriorated by 17 %. The attitude towards the Vietnamese was the most positive since
2013 when it was measured for the first time.
From the author’s experience, the Vietnamese community is often seen as hard-working,
friendly and ambitious. The history of the Vietnamese minority in the Czech Republic dated its
origins to 1956 when the first immigration from Vietnam to Czechoslovakia took place. That
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year the Czechoslovakia and Vietnam signed a treaty on scientific and technologic cooperation.
In the following decades, many immigrants came to Czechoslovakia to work or study (CZ
Government 2013). Currently, there are about 60 000 officially registered Vietnamese (CSO
2019), but the unofficial number is estimated to be more than 100 000.
The Czechoslovak-Vietnamese treaty was not the only inter-governmental treaty focused on
offering job and school vacancies to immigrants. The same year (1956), the Czechoslovak
government signed a treaty with Egypt. The policy of scholarships for Middle Eastern students
became a part of Czechoslovak foreign policy towards the region. Soon afterwards, there were
students from Syria (even members of the Assad family), Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon,
Tunisia, Morocco and Palestine (Hannová 2014, 108). In 1960, there were 760 international
students in Czechoslovakia, 400 of those were from Arab countries, and since the 1960s, the
Arab students were one of the biggest foreign student group in Czechoslovakia (Hannová 2013,
31, 100). Many Arab nationals came to Czechoslovakia for medical treatment (Ibid.) There are,
however, no exact numbers of how many Arabs actually studied in former Czechoslovakia.
From the author’s personal experience, Czechoslovakia was a favourite destination for many
Arabs during the previous regime. Many of them share their positive memories on Czech
culture, cuisine, architecture and nature.
Given the very similar development of mutual relations between Czechoslovakia and Vietnam,
and Czechoslovakia and Arab countries, the difference in current perception of Vietnamese and
Arabs in the Czech Republic remains unexplained. This leads us to an essential factor of
Islamophobia.

4.1.2 Islamophobia
In the minds of most of Czechs Arab equals Muslim. In June 2018, a public poll was conducted
by a MEDIAN agency, called Relation and knowledge of Czechs in relation to the Muslim
minority.
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Graph 7: Fear of Arabs (in %)
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When the respondents were asked about their feelings about Muslim and non-Muslim migrants
from the Arab countries, the research showed significant differences. Whereas 79 % of
respondents were afraid of Muslims, only 41 % are afraid of Christians and other denominations
from Arab countries. The level of fear of Muslims is almost double compared to that of Arab
non-Muslims.
Factors contributing to greater fear of Muslims are age, education and political party
preferences. Less significant factors are visiting a dominantly Islamic country and knowing a
Muslim personally. The factors of age, education, but also unemployment are an important part
of this analysis and are further explained in the chapters on the audience.
Graph 8: Attitudes towards Muslims in different age groups (in %)
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Closed attitude towards Muslims is more significant among older generations, as well as among
those who have lower levels of education. Whereas university graduates are open to Muslims
in 53 %, only 23 % of those with primary education share the same attitude. More prone to fear
of Islam are voters of SPD, KSČM and ANO (political parties’ profiles follow in the next
chapter). Slightly more open towards Muslims are those who have visited an Islamic country
in the past and by 10 % more open are people who personally know a Muslim (MEDIAN 2018).
Fear of Muslims is often referred to as Islamophobia. This thesis does not aim to provide an
overview of various definitions and associated discussions. The following chapters use the term
Islamophobia in the sense of Runnymede Trust, which offers two definitions. The short one is:
“Islamophobia is anti-Muslim racism.” The extended definition is based on the more general
UN definition of racism: “Islamophobia is any distinction, exclusion or restriction towards, or
preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field
of public life.” (Elahi and Khan 2017, 10)
Czech scholar of Religious studies Ivan Štampach defines three motivations for Islamophobia
in the Czech Republic:
1. Religiously motivated anti-Islamism
2. Racial and ethnic anti-Islamism
3. Anti-Islamism motivated by protection of liberal values
Religiously motivated Islamophobia (the author uses anti-Islamism and Islamophobia as equal
terms) stems from the dominant role of Roman Catholic role in the Czech environment. Even
though the Catholic church either through Nostrae Aetate of the Second Vatican Council
established good relations with Islam, followed in more recent days by proclamations of current
Pope Francis, the Catholic church in the Czech Republic, represented by the cardinal Dominik
Duka often talks about Islam as inherently violent religion and the situation in Europe compared
to “civilizational suicide” (Echo24 2016; Štampach 2017, 185)
Racial and ethnic anti-Islamism is implicit in many of the new political parties in the Czech
Republic. The public manifestation of this is the notion of endangerment of a white heterosexual
male. One of the relatively famous Czech writers, Benjamin Kuras wrote a book called The
Dusk of White Men (2012). But the racism is manifested in more everyday situations too. In
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2017 an international supermarket chain Lidl printed a commercial flyer featuring a black
model. The outcry from some of the customers was in some cases almost hysterical as they
commented on the supermarket’s Facebook page, complaining about “multicultural
indoctrination” or in general about the ethnic background of the model (iDnes 2017).
Anti-Islamism motivated by protection of liberal values does not stand on either religious
grounds or race. It is based on the notion that the level of human rights is deficient in many
Islamic countries and therefore, to many, this level of human rights is interpreted to be caused
by Islam. This motivation is significantly paradoxical, given the fact that its representatives
would, in order to protect liberal values, restrain said values (Štampach 2017, 192).
As shown further on in this thesis, in many cases, these three motivations overlap and are rarely
used separately. The notion of Islamophobia has one common ground – a fear of Islamization
of the country. Given the statistics on the numbers mentioned in the Introduction, it is obvious
how irrational this fear is. Even though it can be fuelled through various motivations, there is
probably a root of this phenomena, which requires a more profound knowledge of the history
of the Czech Republic.

4.1.3 Historical roots of fear
When Grzegorz Eikert and Daniel Ziblatt wrote a paper on democratization in Central and
Eastern Europe, they used a unique approach to the object of their studies – the long run
continuity. Their claim is that in order to understand contemporary events, it is necessary to go
to deep history and look for factors there. Their study claimed that the events happening after
the collapse of communist regimes in the region could be matched with the pre-communist era
(Ekiert and Ziblatt 2013). Since the theory on deep history was already applied in the region of
Central and Eastern Europe, it could also be applied to different phenomenon than
democratization. The theory claims that events that happened in the past shape current situation
even when the certain events happened a century ago and the continuity was broken by the
decades of non-democratic rule. Accepting the outcome of the theory, it can be argued that the
roots of Islamophobia might be written in the deep history of the nation, and they continue to
shape the current views of contemporary Czechs.
First significant contact with Muslim population can be dated to the end of the 19th century
when first migrants from Bosnia started to settle in the Czech Republic. Before this time, the
contacts with Islam was minimal and spontaneous, but since the Ottoman Empire never fought
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any battle on Czech territory, the local population practically knew about Islam only from songs
and tales3 (Ostřanský 2017a, 27; Mendel 2006, 16).
In 1918 as the First Czechoslovak Republic was established, it was a multi-national state with
Germans living in most of Czech border areas, Polish living in the north and Hungarians in a
large portion of today’s Slovakia. The Czechs and Slovaks had not a common history in one
state, yet this state was created, based on the “Czechoslovak nationality” which never existed
before. The reason for this artificial nationality was said national plurality. Without Slovaks,
the German minority would be too powerful, which was seen as a danger to the new state. This
is potentially the inherited problem which seems to be carried through the history – the founding
idea of national identity which is always endangered by foreign powers – just as the country
broke free from centuries-long patronage of the Austria-Hungary empire. This discourse of
constant danger from abroad is apparent even today, both in the manifestation of Islamophobia
and in the general rhetoric on the need to protect the country, its culture, values and national
identity.
The Muslim community tried throughout the First Republic to officially establish their presence
and build a mosque, yet the state officials refused their right to found a religious organization.
The organization uniting Czech Muslims was officially established during the Nazi
Protectorate, and at that time it was associated by anti-Semitism. After the Second World War,
the head of the organization Hajji Alois Bohdan Brikcius was arrested for collaboration with
the Nazis. Given the fact that the after-war era legislation cancelled all the legal acts of the
Protectorate, the Muslim organization lost its legal status and stayed in the legal underground
and inactivity until 1989 (Mendel 2006, 18).
The historical status of Islam and the Czech lands can be summed up in the following way:
First, there were folk tales about exotic warriors advancing through Europe, then first migrants
from Islamic parts of Balkan came and settled, yet the official status was reached in cooperation
with the Nazi regime. After the war, the Muslim organization left the public space and stayed
in general inactive until the Velvet Revolution of 1989. The negative experience and images of
Muslims from the past, according to the theory of long-run continuity might be one of the
reasons why Islamophobic views are so prevalent in the contemporary Czech Republic. These
images have the potential of being used by contemporary actors in order to create an antiIslamic atmosphere in today’s society (Ostřanský 2017b, 45, 49).

3

An example of such work is a 16th century book called Anti al Koran
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Another argument which applies not only to the Czech Republic is the need for a common
enemy. As Czech researcher Daniel Křížek states, there has always been a need of division “us
versus them”. “Every human group needs a foreign group in relation to which it defines itself
and uses it as a significant tool for maintaining internal integrity.” (Křížek 2017, 109) As shown
later in this thesis, the logic of us versus them is very apparent in Czech politics, especially in
the context of the EU Parliament pre-election campaign. In many cases, they were not actually
Muslim migrants, but the Brussels officials who, as many parties deemed, facilitate said
migration. This way of channelling the thoughts allowed many anti-EU parties to connect
migration from the MENA region with the EU institutions. The same situation, although more
known and intense, has been happening in Hungary recently. This is proof of similar trajectories
among the Visegrad group countries.
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5 Securitizing actors
This chapter focuses on political parties and political actors active in the studied case – the
election campaign before the European Parliament elections of May 2016. As mentioned
earlier, there was a total of 39 political parties entering the election in the Czech Republic. The
research sample is limited only to relevant political parties. The criteria of relevancy were 1)
being a parliamentary political party at the time of elections, 2) being represented in the preelection EU parliament, 3) receiving a mandate in the May 2019 EU Parliament elections. Any
party that fulfils any of the three criteria is relevant for the research.
There are 10 political parties fulfilling the criteria. These 10 parties received in the May 2019
EU elections 89,24 % of votes (ČSÚ 2019). In the most recent Parliamentary election to the
Chamber of Deputies in 2017, these ten parties gained 95,27 % votes (ČSÚ 2017).
Table 2: Relevant political parties and the election results
Founded
2011
ANO
1878
ČSSD
1919
KDU-ČSL
1990
KSČM
1991
ODS
2009
Pirates
2015
SPD
2004
STAN
2009
TOP09
2009
Free Party
Source: (ČSÚ 2014; 2017; 2019)

EU 20144
16,13 % (4)
14,17 % (4)
9,95 % (3)
10,98% (3)
7,67 % (2)
4,78 % (0)
-

EU 20195
21,18% (6)
3,95% (0)
7,24% (2)
6,94% (1)
14,54% (4)
13,95% (3)
9,14% (2)

15,95 % (4)7

11,65% (3)8

5,24% (1)

0,65% (0)

CoD 20176
26,64% (78)
7,27% (15)
5,8% (10)
7,76% (15)
11,32% (25)
10,79% (22)
10,64% (22)
5,18% (6)
5,31% (7)
1,56% (0)

The relevant political parties can be divided into three groups – the historical parties such as
Social Democrats (ČSSD) and Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) were established even before
independent Czechoslovakia came into existence. These parties, however, were not active
during the communist era (even though formally both of them existed to create the illusion of
free elections) and therefore the beginning of the Czech party system in the early 1990s. Two
major political powers were dominant throughout the last decade of the 20th century – the Social

4

Results of the election to the European Parliament in 2014, number of seats in brackets (21 total)
Results of the election to the European Parliament in 2019, number of seats in brackets (21 total)
6
Results of the election to the Chamber of Deputies in 2017, number of seats in brackets (200 total)
7
In 2014, TOP09 and STAN shared a list of candidates
8
In 2019, TOP09 and STAN shared a list of candidates
5
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Democrats (ČSSD) and the right-wing conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Both
parties at that time usually got between 25 – 30 % of votes in the Chamber of Deputies elections.
As it is apparent from the table above, most of the traditional parties did not succeed in the
European elections in 2019. The Social Democrats, who were one of the two dominant parties
in previous decades, lost all their mandates and are not represented in the EU Parliament, for
the first time since 2004. On the contrary, parties founded in this century were relatively
successful. The leading party ANO won the elections (even though their result was not as good
as in the Chamber of Deputies election of 2017). The Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD),
a radical right political party calling for Czexit gained two Members of EU Parliament and
Pirates, the only clearly pro-European relevant political party has three representatives in the
EU parliament (Havlík 2019b, 116).
The turnout was 28,72 %. This seemingly small number, compared to other EU member states,
is actually the highest turnout in the history of EU Elections in the Czech Republic.
Graph 9: Turnout in the EU Elections 2004 - 2019
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5.1 Make Czechia Great Again?
The leitmotiv of the election campaign was the accent on protecting Czech interests. This was
manifested, for example, in the campaign motto of ANO – Strong Czechia and We will protect
Czechia. With Strength and Without Compromises. Prime Minister Andrej Babiš even used a
red baseball cap with the motto written on it in the campaign, and he admitted that it was
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inspired by Donald Trump. Freedom and Direct Democracy also adopted originally Trump’s
motive, and their motto was Czechia First. As Havlík in his analysis called No Country for Old
Parties notes, “the notion of the national interests was also common for moderately proEuropean political parties.” (Havlík 2019b, 116)
In many cases, the campaign seemed to be an action taken against Brussels, in an apparent
mindset of us versus them. The important and reoccurring themes were increasing the role of
nation-states in Europe, protection of national interests and values, increasing sovereignty of
nation-states at the expense of limiting powers of Brussels officers, anti-integration etc. Fifteen
years after the Czech Republic entered the European Union, the majority of the political scene
aims for limiting its powers and paradoxically doing so by getting elected into the European
Parliament.

5.2 Second Party System and Populism
The way the new political parties re-shaped the political scene in the Czech Republic, but also
in many other Central and Eastern European countries needs further elaboration. This subchapter aims to explain the role of populism as well as the theory of the second party system.
The second party system is a common phenomenon occurring in many (Ágh researched five)
new member states, including the Czech Republic. This theory claims that due to
disappointment in economic development and quality of livelihood, populist parties are on the
rise, replacing the traditional post-1989 party system, which they claim has failed (see Ágh
2018).
The East European social and national populism is, according to Ágh, based on “1) crisis-prone,
premature, welfare societies, or pre-welfare societies, that are still very far from achieving wellbeing characterized by sustainability and life-satisfaction; and on 2) the age-old tensions with
local outsiders – autochthon ethnic minorities, such as the Roma, Jewish populations, and local
minority groups from neighbouring countries” (Ágh 2018, 30). The new political parties, which
Ágh calls by umbrella term second party system are a result of populism from above. The
traditional, first party system was too weak, and it was easy for newly appearing populists,
extremists and oligarchs to overtake the political scene, especially in the atmosphere of
dissatisfaction and Euroscepticism.
The second party system is established during a so-called critical election. For an election to be
critical, three reconfigurations need to occur – (1) ideological (new issues, discourses and
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patterns of behaviour, (2) social (transformation of parties-base relations) and (3) political (new
parties, shifting on left-right scale (Ágh 2018, 34).
In the years 1998 – 2010, there were always five parties represented in the Czech Chamber of
Deputies. These were the Communist Party (KSČM), the Social Democrats (ČSSD), the
Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), the Civic Democratic Party, and a fifth smaller party, usually
liberal right-wing party or the Greens. This is what Ágh calls the first party system. Since the
2010 elections until now, the party system underwent radical changes, shifting to the second
party system. An obvious way of observing these changes are the numbers of parties in the
parliament and the number of seats each of them occupies. In 2006, the four traditional parties
that were in the Chamber of Deputies since the dawn of the Czech political party system
(KSČM, ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, ODS) occupied 194 seats out of 200. Nowadays, all four parties
are still present in the lower chamber, but they occupy 63 seats out of 200. Whereas in 2006
there were five political parties in the Chamber of Deputies, now there are nine.
The three reconfigurations mentioned by Ágh are present – ideology has shifted from traditional
cleavages to anti-establishment, the social configuration has abandoned the party-membership
model, and political configuration has undergone the most radical change of fragmentation of
the political spectrum with both radical left and right present. As a result, the Central and
Eastern European region is now characterized by poor governance, low performance and weak
competitiveness (Ágh 2018, 39–40).
A typical example of a populist party in the Czech Republic is ANO (Havlík 2019a, 13).
According to Havlík’s research, ANO managed by its actions undermine the liberal principles
of the country as it rejected the party-politics logic, it does not focus on left-right scale and
pursues a technocratic populist discourse (Havlík 2019a, 14).
By abandoning the typical ideological profile, which was characteristic for the traditional
parties, ANO opened new possibilities which would be difficult to achieve in the first party
system. The current government of ANO and the Social Democrats has a minority of seats but
is supported by the Communist party (KSČM) which has now the most influential role in postcommunist history. Even without the votes of Social Democrats, ANO has been at various
instances able to create ad hoc voting coalitions, most frequently with the right-wing radical
Freedom and Direct Democracy, and the Communist Party. Thirty years after the Velvet
Revolution, the party system has undergone such radical changes, that extremes from both ends
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of the left and right sides of the spectrum are legitimate political actors with actual impact on
policy-making.
This, according to political scientist Tomáš Lebeda, leads to worsening the quality of
democracy in the Czech Republic. According to him, the Czech Republic is on the trajectory
away from developed democracy, heading towards Asian model of democracy, which is
characterized by the public’s disengagement with politics in exchange for economic stability
and prosperity (ČT 2019b).
The political party system and its development, especially the second party system, bears
characteristics of deteriorating quality of democracy. Many of these new parties, as Ágh notices,
are fuelled by socio-economic discontent and general fear of ethnic/national minorities. The
media discourse of 2015 migration crises helped many of the new parties to successfully adapt
the anti-migrant rhetoric, which was, to a certain extent, accepted by some of the traditional
parties. In EU elections, many parties used the logic of Brussels being the outside force which
stands in opposition to Czech national interests. The question is, what was first? Was the fear
of migrants always present, and the new populist parties took it as an opportunity, or did the
populist parties created the notion of fear? Given the historical development of relations
towards ethnic and national minorities, it can be stated, that certain levels of racism have always
been present, some of the parties used this, and in a circle, they feed this racism, which gives
them support from certain electoral groups.
It is also important to note the correlation between socioeconomic factors (such as education,
quality of livelihood, unemployment) and support for radical parties. For example, in places
with an unemployment rate of less than 2 %, the support for radical right anti-migration
Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) was on average 7,1 %. In places where the
unemployment rate is above 6%, the support for SPD was 13,1 %. The same phenomenon can
be observed with ANO and the Communist Party (KSČM) (ČT 2019a).
The interpretation of the above-mentioned phenomenon could be the following: People living
in the environment of poverty are very vulnerable to external dangers and are very sensitive to
the discourse of migration as a threat. These people, even though having no previous contact
with the MENA migrants, see them as something that could damage their very fragile status.
The notion of dangerous Arab migrants is reinforced by historical archetypes, fear of unknown
and also the security situation in the Middle East. This might be an explanation, why antimigration stance is so strong in a country with almost no migrants. Using the right
33

circumstances, some of the political parties managed to construct a migration crisis without
migrants.
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6 Referent object – protection of what?
Accepting the logic of the theory of securitization, there are several elements necessary to fill
in the equation. The contextual aspects were discussed in previous chapters as well as the
securitizing actors. The following part of the thesis focuses on the referent object.
Referent object is the entity which is threatened and needs to be protected. Most often, but not
exclusively, it is the state. The character of the referent object may vary according to the nature
of the threat. E.g. in the case of military threats, the referent object is usually the state, in
political threat, it may be sovereignty or ideology, in case of environmental threat, the referent
object is, for example, an entire ecosystem or survival of particular kind of species (Buzan,
Waever, and Wilde 1998, 22–23).
In case of securitization of migration, keeping in mind, that securitization is a speech act which
describes the particular phenomenon as a security / existential threat regardless of the factual
existence of a said threat. In other words, by saying something is dangerous, it is deemed as
dangerous not necessarily because it really is, but rather because the audience is told it is. There
are other factors contributing to the amount of acceptance by the audience, such as language,
context or the characteristic features of the given audience. All these factors are discussed
elsewhere in this thesis. What is, however, overlooked by many of the theories mentioned here
are the referent object and its selection.
What exactly is claimed to be endangered by migration? Is it public health, state, democracy,
national interests, lives of civilians, culture, “our way of life”, Europe? In order to answer this,
a content analysis of election manifestos, TV-debates and YouTube spots was conducted,
focusing on the referent object. The analysis looked at specific terms which were connected to
terms such as the need to protect, defend, maintain, keep, uphold, save.
The leading term in quantity was “borders”, more specifically external borders of the EU. These
are very often seen as something that should be protected and/or fortified against migrants.
There were in total of 20 references in 9 program manifestos, all of these references were related
to external border protection against migrants. The table below illustrates in what context were
external borders mentioned
Table 3: Selected references to border protection
Party

Context
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ANO

Internal security starts with the external borders of the
Schengen area.
Full and reliable protection of external border is a
necessary condition for keeping the internal EU borderfree.
The external border has to be absolutely impenetrable;
this is one of our priority goals.

ČSSD

The fundament of security has to be the external borders'
protection.
It is crucial to protect external European borders.

ODS

Fortification of external borders and cooperation of
intelligence services and police in the interest of
protection against illegal migration and terrorism.

SPD

Visa-free movement of EU citizens, with the option to
install border controls in order to prevent Islamic
terrorists and criminals or illegal immigrants from
entering.

TOP09+
STAN

We will secure external borders of common Europe.

Sources: (Programy do Voleb 2019a; 2019b; 2019e; 2019g; 2019i)

It is evident that the external border protection is a theme represented across the political
spectrum. However, some of the parties have not mentioned border protection at all, such as
the Pirates, The Christian Democrats or the Free Party. The Communist party mentions the
protection of external borders as a desirable alternative to allocation quotas (Programy do Voleb
2019d). When the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party talks about optional border controls,
they mean internal borders between the EU member states, because they argue that Western
Europe’s cities are already Islamised, with numerous no-go zones, and it is, therefore, essential
to protect Central and Eastern Europe.
The accent on protecting the external borders is similar to the rhetoric of Fortress Europe,
which is a paradigm used widely by many European political parties and it resonated
significantly at the peak of migration to Europe in 2015. The political parties are well aware of
the importance of the Schengen Area and the freedom of movement within the EU. Re36

establishing border controls on the internal EU borders would be a mostly unpopular step, and
therefore the notion of border protection has transferred onto the external borders. Given the
fact that the Czech Republic has no external borders, this creates an opportunity to pass on the
responsibility for border protection onto the southern European states as well as the EU
leadership as they are the ones seen responsible for protecting the external borders and thus the
security of the EU.
Another referent object, according to the parties’ manifestos is “interests”. They are often
referred to as “our interests”, “Czech interests”, “national interests”. All of the analysed parties,
except the Free Party (whose party manifesto is rather minimalistic), mentioned the interests.
None of the parties defined what are the interests specifically. Interestingly, some of the parties
proved to be EU-interests-oriented, while others referred to interests as something to be
protected from the EU.
Table 4: Selected references to interests
Party

Context

ANO

There is plenty of what can endanger us. We need to stay vigilant and ready
to protect our country and our national interests.

ČSSD

ČSSD will protect the Czech interests in the EU.

KDU-ČSL

It is a vital interest of the Czech Republic to make use of the opportunities
given to us by the (EU) membership.

KSČM

The membership of the Czech Republic in the EU makes sense only if it
helps to realize Czech national interests and commonly beneficial peace
cooperation of the European nations.

ODS

Let’s learn to protect our interests better.

Pirates

Europe needs to be organized in the common interest of all European
citizens, as well as in the interest of its member states.

SPD

The SPD movement is the only political party which thoroughly protects
the Czech national interests.

TOP09+STAN We will do everything we can to make the Czech Republic a powerful
player in the EU, actively pursuing our interests in cooperation with other
EU member states, not at their expense.
Sources: (Programy do Voleb 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; 2019d; 2019e; 2019f; 2019g; 2019i)
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The table above shows the references to “interest” across the various relevant political parties.
And it is possible to identify at least three positions. The prevailing one is the notion of necessity
to protect the national interests in the EU, in a rather uncompromising way. The winner of the
election and currently the strongest political party ANO even mobilize the voters to be vigilant,
manifesting the notion of danger coming from many directions and the need to be ready to
protect the interests. The first position is protectionism – we need to protect our general interests
against an implicit danger.
The second position sees the membership in the EU as an opportunity to pursue the interests –
this is the position of the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and TOP09+STAN. These parties
see the EU as a forum for cooperation in which national interests can be ensured while
maintaining a constructive and cooperative role towards other member states.
The third position is represented by the Pirates, and it is Europeanism. It highlights the interests
of all European citizens and does not differentiate between Czech citizens and the others. It also
mentions the interests of all the member states, so it is not Czech-centred. Among all the
selected parties, the Pirates represent an exceptionally pro-EU stance.
Among other less frequently mentioned referent objects were “values” and “traditions”. The
Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) calls in its manifesto for “cooperation, which will
respect and protect our sovereignty, freedom, culture and traditional societal values” and their
manifesto also mentions that “for the EU, patriotism and traditional values of our civilization,
are bad words” (Programy do Voleb 2019g). The Christian Democrats names its values:
“respect for human dignity, individual freedom, democracy, equality in law, state of law, human
rights, protection of minority rights, peacekeeping and struggle for pursuing the common good”
(Programy do Voleb 2019c). It is apparent that values and its protection is approached by
various parties differently. The contrast in interpreting values as patriotism, traditions and the
protection of civilization on the one hand and respect for human dignity and minority rights on
the other is characteristic for the atmosphere in the Czech society.
In the manifestos as well as in pre-election TV debates, the parties’ representatives often talked
about protection of values and interests while rarely explaining what the values and interests
are. Using these rather powerful words as electoral mobilization triggers, while not giving them
a specific meaning creates is characteristic for the analysed elections. A possible explanation
of logic of this is that by creating the notion of endangerment of the referent objects (borders,
state, values, culture, interests etc.) from the unspecific external other enables the voters to
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identify with the parties, as the individual voters fill in the blanks with what they feel being
endangered by.
The previous chapter established the presence of referent objects in the parties’ manifestos.
Among those mentioned above, the most common ones were borders and interests. While the
protection of interest is explained rather vaguely, the border protection was directly connected
with internal (state) security. This shows the substantial manifestation of protecting the division
between us and the other. The framing of external threat is the topic of the following, the core
chapter of this thesis – the analysis of securitization of migration.
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7 Speaking security – the securitization speech in the
electoral campaign
This chapter is devoted to the securitization of migration in the pre-election campaign before
the European Parliament elections in May 2019. Firstly, a brief revision of what is securitization
will follow.
The thesis uses the theory of securitization as proposed by the authors of Copenhagen School
(CS) and further developed by Thiery Balzacq. Securitization, as explained above, is a speech
act which turns an issue into a security threat regardless of the actual threat level. In order for
securitization to be successful, it needs to be placed in the correct contextual frame, it needs to
be audience centred, and the message of the speech act needs to be power-laden, meaning that
it calls for specific actions that would allow the political leaders to take extraordinary action
(e.g. securing the borders, introducing security measures etc.). An important role is therefore
played by the audience, the actors and the context. Further crucial factors are the securitizing
actors and the referent object – in other words, who says what should be protected. These factors
were researched in the previous chapters, offering both the analysis on referent objects and a
brief introduction into the party system and the relevant parties researched.
The analysis of the research material is divided into two groups – the contextual analysis and
the content analysis. The contextual analysis looks at the bigger picture – how is the issue of
migration framed in the materials, among which other issues. For example, migration might be
in the manifesto mentioned among pathological issues such as organized crime, terrorism, or
among labour market-related issues. The content analysis looks in greater detail on how do
political parties operate with the term migration – what language is used.

7.1 Terrorism, organized crime and…. migration? Contextual analysis
Migration as an issue is present in all the parties’ manifestos, yet in a different context.
However, the majority of relevant parties mentioned migration in chapters related to Safety.
The manifestos chapters mentioning migration have various names, the following table
summarises them, giving an overview of the framing of migration.
Table 5: Migration related chapters
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Party

Chapter name

ANO

We will decide who is going to live and work with us

ČSSD

Foreigners’ movements should be controlled by nation-states, not
Brussels
Terrorism and organized crime, the safe Czech Republic in safe Europe,
that’s fair

KDU-ČSL

Safe and just Europe

KSČM

Peace and safety for the EU citizens! EU politics - looking for
understanding, not confrontation

ODS

Safety

Pirates

International Affairs

SPD

We will say decisive NO in the EU parliament

TOP09+STAN

Europe guarantees safety

Free Party

Stop centralization of immigration and asylum policy

(Programy do Voleb 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; 2019d; 2019e; 2019f; 2019g; 2019i; 2019h)
It is apparent that in most cases, migration is seen as a security issue by default and therefore it
is mentioned under security-related chapters or in its own chapters. Migration is often used in
the same chapters as human trafficking, terrorism, border protection, weapon proliferation or
organized crime. The possibly most different exception is the Pirates. They put migration under
International Affairs, and they talk about legal labour migration, asylum seekers and high
skilled migration (Programy do Voleb 2019f). This is the only case where the context of
migration is positive.
Another important contextual factor is the foreign aid policy. In favour of providing foreign aid
in the countries of origin were ANO, Social Democrats (ČSSD), Christian Democrats (KDUČSL) and Communists (KSČM). These parties claim that the root causes of migration, such as
unemployment, poverty and natural disasters need to be directly addressed in order to prevent
further migration from Africa and Asia. The Pirates, on the other hand, state the following: “We
strongly do not recommend using development aid as a means to prevent short term goals, such
as restriction on economic migration” (Programy do Voleb 2019f).
In many academic studies (see Gamso and Yuldashev 2018; Bakewell 2008; McKeon 2018;
Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011) the effect of foreign aid on migration is largely
disputed, some authors have even reached the opposite conclusion – foreign aid might increase
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migration, and it causes uncontrollable rural-urban migration. These researches are, however,
not taken into consideration by the political parties, and there is a significant possibility that the
political parties have never studied the effects of development aid on migration. It is, however,
not only the Czech political policymakers who seem to overlook the opposite effect of foreign
development aid on migration, as based on the previously mentioned researches, the EU
institutions are ignoring their findings too, which leads to commodification of migrants and the
exchange of funds for keeping migrants (see Tsourapas 2019).
The idea of preventing migration or as many parties call it “solving migration” by providing
funds to the countries of origin show another critical fact – the limited knowledge on basic facts
regarding migration as well as, from a moral point of view, somewhat problematic reason to
provide international development aid.
Firstly, it is essential to realize that there are many in need of assistance, and they are not in
their country of origin and simply cannot return to their country of origin because they are afraid
of prosecution.
Secondly, by providing funds to countries that are very often authoritarian or can be labelled as
failed states, the EU states only deepen the problems in such countries, or even fund an ongoing
civil war, as is the case of Libya and the negotiations with Khalifa Haftar.
Thirdly and most importantly, it creates a notion of two things – (1) the primary goal of foreign
aid is to help the EU, not the countries of origin; (2) migration is something that is solvable.
This misunderstanding of migration as a problem that needs to be solved is shaping the current
politicians’ approach to migration, yet it leads to further problems. The migrant population has
been estimated for several decades to be about 3 % of the world population (UN 2017; World
Bank 2019), yet this does not justify political leaders, and particularly the West, as labelling
migration as something deviant.
Labelling migration as a security issue is even more problematic in Eastern Europe. During the
communist regimes in Eastern Europe, hundreds of thousands of people left their countries of
origin and applied for asylum in the West. Very often, they had to be smuggled through
dangerous borders, and many were killed in the process. This exile population returned home
after the regime changes of 1989 and in many cases became the authorities which founded the
current democratic regimes in the region of Eastern Europe. From this point of view, it is
difficult to understand how these countries are the ones who 30 years after the fall of
communism see migration as a security issue.
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Migration in the view of most relevant political parties is a problem, a security issue that needs
to be addressed with the same urgency as terrorism, organized crime or weapon proliferation.
It is often connected to foreign development aid which is seen, regardless of the scientific
findings, as an efficient way of stopping migration. With one exception, the political parties
claim that migration should be solved or stopped. The only political party that approaches
positively to migration and refuses the effects of development aid on migration are the Pirates.
Framing migration as a security issue and putting it in context of terrorism and other security
threats show the misunderstanding (or misinterpreting) of migration, which is mainly in the
historical context of Eastern Europe morally problematic and points out that the issue is framed
in a way that would mobilize the people. The context of how migration is framed in the parties’
manifestos is already securitizing. The following sub-chapter looks specifically on the issue of
migration, the attributes, the language and approaches.

7.2 Content analysis
The simple content analysis does not provide sufficient insight which would show the
securitization of migration, yet still, it is useful for illustrating the importance of migration in
the parties’ manifestos. The table below shows the frequency of referring to migration in
individual manifestos. Since migration in the context of this thesis serves as umbrella term for
different kinds of migration as well as for refugees, both migration and refugees were taken
into consideration. The migration column shows the number of words with the -migra- stem
(such as immigrant, immigration, migrant, migration), the refugee column shows the number
of times refugees were mentioned. The frequency was calculated by dividing the sum of
migration and refugee references by the number of words. The length of manifestos varies
greatly, and by calculating the frequency using the specific word count, it shows a comparable
figure.
Table 6: Content analysis, parties sorted by frequency
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Party
SPD
Free Party
TOP09+STAN
KDU-ČSL
KSČM
ANO
ODS
ČSSD
Pirates

Wordcount Migration Refugee Frequency
1389
12
0
0,00864
928
6
0
0,00647
5665
16
2
0,00318
1898
5
1
0,00316
4209
12
1
0,00309
4019
10
1
0,00274
1881
4
1
0,00266
4757
5
2
0,00147
8212
5
0
0,00061

The frequency referring to migration varies among the researched parties. It would be, however,
incorrect to assume that the parties which talk about migration most are at the same time the
most significant securitizing actors. Mentioning migration does not necessarily mean
securitizing migration. The reference to migration can be in both negative and positive context.
This is why more detailed content analysis is needed – what attributes are used in connection
to migration?
The frequency, however, points out, that migration is mentioned by all the parties, and as a
result, there are in total 83 references which need to be further analysed.
Table 7 records the number of references to specific attributes and associated terms. It clearly
shows that among the most frequent attributes are illegal migration (the term irregular
migration which is mostly used in academia is not used by Czech politicians), migration quotas,
the migration crisis, migration wave and also solving migration. All these terms are often used
by East European media too, so it is not a language that is characteristic only for politicians.
The most frequent attributes reflect the public debate on migration which took place after the
2015 events. Illegal migration is primarily used in order to label migrants as criminals. By this
projection, it is more justifiable to use extraordinary measures in order to prevent them from
entering the country or the EU. Migration quotas, the second most frequent attribute was to a
great extent discussed over the last few years in regards to the EU decision to introduce quotas
so that the southern EU member states could distribute some of their migrants to other countries
and thus share the responsibility. The Visegrad group countries saw this, however not as
redistribution of responsibility but rather redistribution of a burden. Migration crisis and wave
are both terms used to describe the situation during the peak of migration in 2015. It is
interesting to watch how these terms prevailed for four years and regardless of the current
numbers of migrants, these images of wave and crisis are still influential.
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Table 7: Migration, associated terms and attributes – number of references

attribute
illegal migration
migration quotas
migration crisis
migration wave
solving migration
legal migration
economic migration
asylum policies
mass migration
dangerous migrants
repatriation policies
migration pressure
uncontrolled migration
prejudices on migrants
dignity of migrants
inadaptable migrants

ANO
4
2
2
1

ČSSD
3
3

KDU-ČSL
1
1

KSČM
2
2
1
4

ODS
1
1
2

Pirates

SPD
2
2

1
1
1

2
3
2
3
2
1

3
1
1

Free
TOP09+STAN Party

1
3
2

1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
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1
1

Total
13
12
9
7
6
4
4
3
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
1

Nevertheless, even the analysis of attributes and associated terms does not provide proof of
securitization of migration. There are some attributes such as dangerous migrants which do
present migrants as a threat. However, it is necessary to broaden the scope of analysis and look
beyond the attributes – analyse the complete statements. If for example, we already know that
illegal migration is mentioned most often, it is necessary to analyse in what sense. The
following part focuses on the speech acts of securitization in the parties’ manifestos.
Out of the 9 manifestos of a total length of 114 pages, 108 statements were selected. These
statements are directly connected to migrants or asylum seekers. Among these statements were
selected those that explicitly securitize migration. The explicit securitization of migration is
defined by the following criteria:


Migration is mentioned in the context of terrorism, organized crime and other threats



Migration is directly labelled as a dangerous phenomenon or security issue



Migration is described as a factor that could lead to worsening the security situation



Migrants are described as criminals



Migration needs to be stopped using restrictive measures (such as border patrols)



Muslims are described as criminals

The following table presents the statements that fulfil the criteria of securitization speech act.
Table 8: Securitizing statements
Party

Statement

ANO

Recent migrant waves from conflict-torn regions undermined security and
political unity of the EU
Internal security of the EU begins at the external borders of Schengen. It is
necessary to use the European border and shore patrol (…) which will in
coordination, ensure the full control [of the border] including prevention
of migrant crises.
External EU border needs to be absolutely impenetrable for illegal
migration.
We will strictly insist on combating illegal migration, smuggling and
human trafficking.
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ČSSD

The number of illegal migrants decreases thanks to better protection of
external borders and the cooperation with countries of origin of illegal
migrants.
We strictly refuse illegal and uncontrolled economic migration which can
have a negative impact on economic, security or social situation in both the
Czech Republic and Europe.
It is crucial to protect the external borders. Thanks to shared systems, we
have an overview of all dangerous people who move across Europe, we
can keep records on them and detain them.
Fighting climate change is not only ecologic but also economical and
security issue. If the catastrophic scenarios are fulfilled, Africa will be
uninhabitable in the near future. Where will the Africans look for a new
home? Probably not in Arabia or Iraq – they will come to Europe.

KSČM

Europe is deeply in severe crisis. It cannot often deal with the inferiority to
the USA and the warfare NATO pact, the blast of illegal migrants,
transnational crime, increasing climate change, deepening chaos in
international relations and many other problems.
Asylum and migration policy should help people in need, yet it must not
lead to worsening security and social situation in the countries of
destination.
The problem is not an individual, but dozens of millions of Africans and
Asians longing for life in a rich Europe.

ODS

We want to increase the security of the external borders and cooperation of
intelligence services and police in the interest of protection against illegal
migration and terrorism.

SPD

The European Union let into Europe millions of unadaptable migrants who
murder, rape, steal and commit acts of terrorism.
Large cities of Western Europe have already been Islamised, and Islamic
ghettos and no-go zones are spreading rapidly.
Together with European patriots, we will defend ourselves against
Islamisation.
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Western Europe will become more and more Islamised. If there will be no
chance to save the West European states, we at least have to protect Central
Europe.
We support the visa-free movement of the European citizens, but with the
option to implement border controls in order to prevent Islamic terrorists,
criminals and illegal migrants from entering [the Czech Republic].
TOP09+STAN We are aware of the security risks of climate change (possible wars for
resources and migrant waves due to a significant worsening of life
conditions).
Ensuring the safety of the EU citizens and finding a common solution in
the field of migration is the fundamental premise for the future of the
Schengen area.
Free Party

The Czech Republic has its own immigration and asylum policies which
are set very well, and we want to keep it that way. So that others would not
have to suffer because of other states, where due to their own fault, things
got out of hand.

Sources: (Programy do Voleb 2019a; 2019b; 2019d; 2019e; 2019g; 2019i; 2019h)
In general, the statements show that in most cases, migration is something that is undesired; it
is potentially dangerous and needs to be addressed. The way of facing migration is often
described as preventing, stopping, reducing and combating. Very often, migration is
appropriated to terrorism. The following table shows the frequency of securitizing statements
out of other migration-related statements. The purpose of the table is to offer a comparative
overview of how frequent are securitizing statements. The frequency is based on the total
number of statements referring to migration and the number of securitizing statements.
Table 9: Frequency of securitizing statements
Party
Statements - total
Securitizing statements
SPD
14
KSČM
10
ANO
14
ČSSD
14
ODS
4
Free Party
4
TOP09+STAN
13
KDU-ČSL
6
Pirates
20
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Frequency
5
3
4
4
1
1
2
0
0

0,357
0,300
0,286
0,286
0,250
0,250
0,154
0,000
0,000

Most of the parties did use securitizing statements in regards to migration. The most frequent
use of securitizing speech act was observed in the case of Freedom and Direct Democracy
(SPD). This party also had the highest frequency of referring to migration in general. Given the
clear anti-migration stance of the party, these results are not surprising. There are, however,
other important content-related factors in the manifestos, which are not securitizing per se, yet
are essential for understanding the party-audience communication as well as the atmosphere in
the society in general. Although these non-securitizing statements are somewhat difficult to
analyse, ignoring them would make the analysis incomplete. In the following part, these
statements are recorded and briefly put into context, party by party.

7.2.1 ANO
The ANO movement, the currently strongest political party in the Czech Republic, is also the
most significant representative of the so-called second party system. It is a party that was
established on criticism of the former political party elites, their clientelism, corruption and
alleged inability to produce results which would lead to improving live quality in the Czech
Republic. This party entered the campaign with a motto We will protect Czechia. Strong and
without compromises. The motto clearly appeals to voters who feel endangered by the unknown
other. When looking closely into the manifesto, it very vaguely describes against whom
Czechia needs to be protected. “We will protect our country and our people from both the threats
of today and anything that is not fair and what could complicate our lives” (Programy do Voleb
2019a). It can be stated that the manifesto has securitizing appeal without implicitly mentioning
the specific threats.
Apart from the securitizing statements mentioned in Table 8, ANO focuses on improving the
efficiency of return policies as well as focusing on development aid in Africa. It calls it
“Marshall Plan for Africa”. Another way of addressing the challenges of migrations are,
according to the party, the establishment of “receiving centres” on the external borders and
“supporting solving the refugees’ situation in countries of origin” (Ibid.)
The migration policies should be determined by the individual member states, and national
offices should decide on legal, economic migration according to the needs of the current labour
market (Ibid.).
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7.2.2 ČSSD – Social Democratic Party
The Social Democrats highlight the achievements of their ministers of interior and foreign
affairs. The refusal of migrants’ redistribution quotas being the most significant of them, in
regards to migration. A strong accent is put on the role of sovereign states in the process of
deciding who gets to be accepted. What is rather interesting, is the statement that “despite the
false allegations from the political competition, the Social Democratic Party is not promigration” (Programy do Voleb 2019b). It is worth noting, that from the point of view of
mainstream Czech politics, being pro-migration is a negative label – in fact so negative, that
the Social Democrats decided to explicitly put it into their manifesto. The refugee seekers’
status should be determined according to national rules.
Migration from Africa also plays the role of a scarecrow in the chapter on climate change. For
ČSSD, facing climate change is essential precisely because of the possible environmentinduced migration.
Regarding foreign aid, which is also an important issue for this party, the Czech Republic is
already active in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Cooperation with countries of origin is
vital in reducing migration (Ibid.)

7.2.3 KDU-ČSL - Christian Democratic Party
The Christian Democrats did not have an explicitly securitizing statement in their manifest.
Their primary focus is on providing foreign development aid and cooperating with Turkey on
the issue of migration. Focusing on root causes of migration in mainly African countries is,
according to the manifesto, a way of solving the migration crisis in general (Programy do Voleb
2019c).
In the chapter on Security, the Christian Democrats mention the importance of “monitoring the
political aspects of Islam and systematic pursuit of those, who spread violence via their
preaching” (Ibid.). KDU-ČSL is one of two political parties mentioned in this research which
explicitly mentions Islam.
The most interesting statement, however, is the following: “We seek justice and all possible
support for all persecuted Christians, including accepting them into the EU, in case they want”
(Ibid.). This pro-immigration stance based on adherence to a religious group is in the context
of Czech politics unique, yet not new. The relative openness to migration of specific group was
manifested already in previous European Parliament term. In September 2018, Member of
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European Parliament Michaela Šojdrová (KDU-ČSL) suggested relocating 50 Syrian orphans
from refugee camps in Greece to the Czech Republic (iROZHLAS 2018b). She was, however,
criticized for this suggestion mainly by Czech prime minister Andrej Babiš (ANO), who stated
the following: “We have orphans here as well and we need to prepare them for their future life”
(iROZHLAS 2018a).

7.2.4 KSČM – The Communist Party
The Communists connected migration with their geopolitical orientation. They focused on the
role of NATO and the USA in current Middle Eastern conflicts and claimed these are
responsible for the migration crisis. The Communist party blames individual politicians for
what it calls a severe crisis, and it demands these politicians who are allegedly responsible for
initiating the migration crisis to step down or be suspended from the office (Programy do Voleb
2019d).
In their manifesto, the Communist Party calls for breaking the stereotypes and prejudices of
migration, while in the following statement it calls “dozens of millions of Africans longing for
life in rich Europe” a problem (Ibid.). The image of millions of people who might flood the
European continent is a very powerful image, as well as a very powerful stereotype.
Together with other parties, the Communists share the view that a proper way of addressing
migration is foreign development aid (Ibid.).

7.2.5 ODS – The Civic Democratic Party
ODS is one of the two main political parties of the first party system (the second one being the
Social Democrats). This conservative party’s manifesto is rather minimalistic on the issue of
migration, with only four statements.
It criticises the redistribution quotas on migrants, calls for financial aid for south European
countries who most often host migrants and wants to face migration challenges via police and
intelligence services’ cooperation. Illegal migration is mentioned alongside with terrorism.

7.2.6 The Pirate Party
The relatively new Pirate party, which entered the national parliament two years ago, is the only
party which has a positive approach to migration. None of the statements was labelled as
securitization. It is also the only party which openly talks about respect and human dignity of
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migrants and asylum seekers. It differentiates between migrants and asylum seekers and calls
for enabling legal ways of migration into the European labour market.
In regards to asylum policy, the Pirate party highlights the importance of proving the country
of origin, and “ensuring the freedom of settling in Europe for those, whose refugee status was
determined” (Programy do Voleb 2019f). By calling for the freedom of settlement, without
specifying where precisely in the EU, the Pirate party basically aims for opening the European
asylum policy, leaving the choice of the country of destination up to the refugees themselves.
This open pro-migration stance is unique. Not only the Pirates do not attempt to securitize
migration, but they also aim for liberalisation of the current asylum policies, making them more
migrant-choice oriented.

7.2.7 SPD – Freedom and Direct Democracy
Given the open anti-immigration and anti-Islamic views of the party representatives, SPD is a
party with most references to migration as well as most cases of securitizing speech acts. They
do not differentiate between the words migrant and Muslim. They label immigrants as nonadaptable criminals, murderers, thieves and terrorists. The EU is, according to SPD, responsible
for letting them in due to its positive approach to migration in its official documents. Western
Europe and mainly its large cities are described as Islamised no-go zones and ghettos, and the
future of Europe is rather gloomy and dangerous.
It is, however, not only the immigrants and the EU which are seen by the Freedom and Direct
Democracy responsible for what they view as Islamic invasion. They blame the “NGOs
supporting ideologies of neo-Marxism, gender and multiculturalism” (Programy do Voleb
2019g).
Their main message is that the EU is beyond reform, and it has to cease to exist. The manifesto
is very emotional. It contains nine exclamation marks and statements such as “Let’s shake
Brussels! If you don’t want to be ruled by people such as Juncker, Macron, Merkel or Soros,
please vote SPD! These elections are, in fact, a referendum on the EU” (Ibid.).
The Soros conspiracy, viral in Hungary, also serves another purpose. It enables actors such as
SPD to divide society. The SPD, as well as some other actors (the president, Communists), use
the term “sluníčkáři” (translated sunshine people) in order to describe usually young people
studying social sciences and humanities, who are opened to multiculturalism, liberal views, promigrant and pro-NGO. There is no exact definition of this term. SPD claims that the sunshine
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people and pro-migration NGOs are funded by an American philanthropist George Soros who
allegedly aims to destroy the European civilization by facilitating migration(see BBC 2019).
This is why, even though Soros is not running in the EU elections, SPD uses his name as an
example of bad leadership.
SPD differs from the rest of the parties in many ways. Most significant is its approach to the
EU, seeing it as a dysfunctional organization. It openly calls migrants criminals, and it uses
conspiracies in order to label certain groups of people as enemies.

7.2.8 Free Party
Free Party is a marginal political party. Their most significant success was gaining one seat in
the European parliament in the previous term. Their rather short manifesto mentions migration
as an example of the EU intervening in a sovereign state’s interests. It sees the West European
states, similarly to SPD, as places where “things got out of hand” (Programy do Voleb 2019h)
regarding migration. The Free Party refuses the quotas and claims that the domestic asylum and
migration system is sufficient and should be kept that way (Ibid.).
To sum up, most of the parties not only securitize migration in their manifestos, they also
criticize the EU for its asylum system, they refuse migrant quotas and, in some cases, they very
explicitly create negative images of migrants – both as criminals and as dozens of millions of
people trying to get into the EU. A widespread stance is an accent on national sovereignty, often
expressed as “nobody will tell us what to do”. Most parties address migration in three ways:
1. Securing the external border by strengthening the border agencies and providing funds
to South European states
2. Making the repatriation process more efficient and faster
3. Providing development aid to countries of origin, especially in Africa and Asia. This
allegedly leads to eliminations of the root causes of migration, and therefore people
would have no push factor.
In conclusion, using the content analysis, it was found that most political parties (with the
exception of the Pirates) used the speech act of securitization of migration in their party
manifestos. Securitization, understood as labelling something as a threat, was done on several
levels. Firstly, migration was in most cases referred to alongside security issues and threats such
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as terrorism, human trafficking and organized crime. Secondly, the attributes given to migration
or migrants were to a large extent negative – illegal migration, the migration crisis, migration
wave, mass migration or dangerous migrants. Thirdly, on the level of individual statements, 7
out of 9 researched relevant political parties made securitizing statements, appropriating
migration directly or indirectly to a security threat.
The explicitness of qualifying migration as a threat did vary among the parties, while some saw
migration as something that should be reduced, or stopped, other parties used images of millions
of migrants or migrants as terrorists and generally dangerous people. There was only one party
which had a positive approach to migration.
Based on the previous research, migration is closely connected so state’s sovereignty. Common
migration and asylum policies are often seen as wrong, as only the state has the right to decide
who is allowed to be admitted. For successful coping with migration are, according to the
majority of parties, important three things: Secure external border, fast repatriation process, and
addressing the so-called root causes of migration.
Identifying securitization in the parties’ manifestos does not automatically mean that
securitization was successful. As mentioned in previous chapters, securitization is seen as a
two-way street between the securitizing actor and the audience. Securitization needs to be
audience cantered in order to be successful. The following chapter explores the audience’s
response to securitization.
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8 Hearing security – the audience’s response to securitization
speech
Audience and context are logically connected. Since Balzacq’s theory sees the context as a
Zeitgeist, a sum of conditions, history, culture, atmosphere and current events, these often
influence the audience. It can be argued that for example, acts of terrorism in France influence
the audience in the Czech Republic. Another factor influencing the audience is media – and not
only in its traditional form, but also social media which play a significant role in shaping the
audience’s opinions. The following chapter elaborates on the interaction between the audience
and the securitizing actor.
Firstly, Balzacq claims that in order to win over the audience, the speaker needs to identify with
the audience and adjust their language to the language of the audience (Balzacq 2005, 184).
When observing the party leaders who used the act of securitization, it might be challenging to
observe how can possibly some of the party leaders identify with the audience. For example,
the leader of ANO and current prime minister Andrej Babiš is the fourth wealthiest person in
the country (Forbes 2019). The chairman of Freedom and Direct Democracy, which is
according to this research, the most anti-migrant relevant political party, Tomio Okamura, was
born in Tokyo to a Czech mother and Japan-Korean father. The obvious question is, how do
these party leaders identify with the audience? The answer seems to be the language.
The previous chapter on securitization as a speech act explored the language of securitization
used in the parties’ manifestos, and it shows that many parties use the language of threat. For
example, ANO and its statement “We will protect our country and our people from both the
threats of today and anything that is not fair and what could complicate our lives” (Programy
do Voleb 2019a) uses the language of protection. As if saying “the world is dangerous and not
fair, we know this, and we will protect you – the country and its people.” Similarly, the SPD
used the language to illustrate the world of chaos filled with migrants who are murdering and
raping, spreading to Europe and occupying West European cities – but then it calls onto public
“(…) please vote SPD”, “We won’t let that happen. We will protect the rights and freedoms of
our citizens (…).” (Programy do Voleb 2019g).
The language in these two cases, as in many others, is protective. It uses the image of external
danger – in case of ANO this danger is unspecified, in case of SPD it is the migrants and the
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EU – and as an answer to these threats, it provides assurance of protection. Regardless of the
racial features, the paradox of a migrant leading an anti-migrant party, or the wealth, it shows
that the language of fear combined with the offering of solution and protection is a potent mix
which resonates in the society. In April 2019, one month before the election, the five party
leaders with highest approval rates were Babiš (ANO, 38 %), Hamáček (ČSSD, 30 %), Bartoš
(Pirates, 29 %), Okamura (SPD, 24 %) and Filip (KSČM, 22 %) (Červenka 2019, 3). After the
election, in September 2019, the approval rate increased for Okamura and Filip. Bartoš and
Babiš kept the same percentage, and Hamáček lost 5 % (Ibid.). This proves that regardless of
wealth or appearance, the language used by the party leaders, who are at the same time the main
faces of the pre-election campaign is efficient, and they manage to gain trust.
Another vital audience related factor is the lack of interest in the European Union’s politics. In
the most recent poll in February 2019, only 6 % of respondents claimed to be really interested
in EU politics, 32 % rather interested (Hanzlová 2019a, 1). This lack of interest among the
majority of population signifies the limited knowledge on the EU processes, and therefore many
voters are not aware of the EU work. It is, therefore, easier to persuade such voters using strong
language on the need for protecting national sovereignty.
This thesis deals with a complex issue of anti-migrant atmosphere and its manifestation in the
pre-election campaign. The complexity stems from the unclear connection between the issues
of migration and Euroscepticism. Since many parties use in the manifestos the logic of being
forced dangerous policies from Brussels, such as the migrant redistribution quotas, it is
necessary to establish the role which is played by the EU or in other words, how Czechs view
the EU.
According to researcher Ivan Kalmar, the Visegrad group countries’ citizens feel to be left out
on the periphery of what is actually happening in Europe. He claims that “many people in EastCentral Europe see their region as a whole as left out of the benefits of global neoliberal
prosperity enjoyed by the local elite in the pay of denationalized, global elites” (Kalmar 2018,
416). This local elite is what in the previous chapter was labelled as sunshine people. Kalmar
describes them as “privileged young people [who] take advantage of EU-sponsored
opportunities to get a foreign education and then either stay abroad or come back to get a job
with a foreign-owned corporation (…). If these young people take up a post with one of the
many NGOs dedicated to freedom and democracy that pay a decent wage, they provoke the
jealousy of older and less educated people” (Kalmar 2018, 415–16).
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The feeling of being left out is, therefore, solid in Czech society. It was shown in previous
chapters that for example, Freedom and Direct Democracy’s electorate is mainly in the regions
with higher unemployment rates or among older and less educated people. The peripherality,
as Kalman describes it, is seen on individual levels as well as national. People who feel to be
left out by the young elite with access to foreign education or job opportunities, or even by
those who have language skills, are likely to feel left out on the EU level too – seeing the level
of wages in Germany or Austria, while 30 years after the regime change they find their quality
of livelihood unsatisfactory. In a recent poll, 38 % of respondents over 40 years of age claim
that they had a better life during the previous regime (iROZHLAS 2019).
This feeling of being left out is what seems to be the identification level of the securitizing
speech act. The identification, in this case, is offering security and protection against the
external dangers. In their research on Social Construction of Target population, Schneider and
Ingram note that “(…) a great deal of the political manoeuvring in the establishment of policy
agendas and in the design of policy pertains to the specification of the target populations and
the type of image that can be created for them.(…) Officials develop maps of target populations
based on both the stereotypes they themselves hold and those they believe in prevailing among
the segment of the public likely to become important to them” (Schneider and Ingram 1993,
336). This means that the securitizing actors are using the audience’s worries and shape their
statements in order to reinforce them. This is why fear and the notion of threat are used as
powerful tools for identifying with the audience.
Balzacq talks about the importance of the securitizing actor’s tuning their speech to the
audience’s experience (Balzacq 2005, 184). The experience, which is somewhat related to the
context, is in the case of the Czech Republic, the feeling of peripherality. A significant
percentage of the population is not interested in the EU politics, yet they feel to be left behind,
and they are not satisfied with their lives, especially after the reality does not meet their
expectations even 30 years after the regime change. While more than a third of people older
than 40 years old do not feel to be better off now, the politicians use the feeling of insecurity
and fear and promise protection. Then they use the image of external enemies, either the
migrants and the EU, or even internal enemies, the sunshine people. The securitization process
is audience centred because it is based on the experience of a significant portion of society.

57

9 Migration crisis without migrants
This chapter is a reflection on what has been found out in the research above. It sums up the
findings and answers the research questions posed at the beginning of this thesis. It also suggests
further areas for research of the Central and East European societies.
Firstly, in hindsight, it is important to reflect on the election results. The elections to European
Parliament in the Czech Republic in May 2019 show several trends. The main one being the
continuous increase in popularity of the parties which were labelled as second party system.
Graph 10: Comparison of European Parliament elections in 2014 and 2019, Czech Republic
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Source: (ČSÚ 2014; 2019)
Almost all of the traditional first party system parties lost votes in the most recent election, with
the exception of ODS. Most significant loss can be observed with ČSSD who did not gain any
seat in the European Parliament. On the other hand, the relatively new parties ANO and Pirates
gained support. SPD was running in this election for the first time, so there are no data available
for comparison. The results can be interpreted as a lack of credibility of the first party system
and searching for an alternative.
The research on the securitization of migration in the Czech Republic can be interpreted as
pointing out several societal issues. The fear of migration is presented as an outcome of several
factors, exactly as Balzacq pointed out. It is mainly a sum of context and audience related
factors, which are used by the securitizing actors to gain political mandate via the agency of
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elections. Context and audience related factors are, however, much more complicated. Last but
not least, the message of securitization statements should not be ignored. Establishing the
efficiency of securitization is important, but so is the content of the actual statements, because
as it was shown, these statements, regardless of how factual they are, shape public opinion and
actions.

9.1 Securitization-friendly circumstances
As explained in previous chapters, the context, or as Balzacq calls it, Zeitgeist is a combination
of national history, culture and experience. National history, when viewed from the perspective
of deep history theory, brings centuries-old events into life in ways which are not always
directly observable in these days. The circumstances under which was the first Czechoslovak
Republic established 101 years ago play an essential role, and so do the periods of totalitarian
regimes, both during the Second World War and the Cold War. Even the pre-WWI history is
filled with oppression under the Habsburg empire. This history of non-freedom is important
when assessing the relation of Central and East European nations to anything that is foreign and
external.
In the context of modern history, now, 30 years after the fall of the communist regime, there
are significant social groups who feel that the previous regime was better than today’s
democracy. These people feel left behind, lost, unhappy and unsatisfied with the way their life
is developing. Unemployment and social vulnerability, combined with higher age and lower
levels of educations are characteristics of social groups which have over the last few years
become the primary target group of many of the securitization actors – in case of this research
– political parties.

9.2 Securitization-ready audience
Fear is one of the basic human emotions. This is why it is so effective when used to gain support.
Political (securitizing) actors use this emotion as a mobilization tool in order to gain attention
and eventually support. As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, there is a significant group
of people who feel vulnerable because of their socio-economic situation and because of the
generational changes. Especially older people who did not have access to foreign education, do
not speak English and had very limited options to travel for most of their life feel endangered
(and maybe jealous) as they observe an increasing number of young people who speak foreign
59

languages, often work for foreign companies and enjoy the freedom to travel. This generation
gap is becoming very apparent now, 30 years after the revolution when the generation born
after the fall of communism becomes politically active. A very illustrative example was a TV
debate in July 2018. A 56-year-old deputy chairman of ANO, Jaroslav Faltýnek was in a heated
discussion with a 29-year-old deputy chairman of Pirates Jakub Michálek. These two politicians
were arguing over the prosecution of prime minister Babiš when suddenly Faltýnek said the
following: “How old are you? (…) It is unacceptable that this boy says things like this”
(Lidovky.cz 2018). What might seem like an emotional statement coming from the heat of the
moment, is actually a Freudian slip which uncovers the deep generation gap.
The vulnerable group of people who feel lost in today’s world are vulnerable to politicians who
use the rhetoric of protection. These politicians create images of external dangers and offer
protection. Migrants – being different from the native population, are a very good mean of such
threat-creating process – securitization. Another significant factor which was not mentioned in
this thesis is the role of media and the internet. According to researches on media literacy, these
vulnerable groups of older people with limited education who are unhappy with their life are
showing low levels of media literacy (Šimoník and Burianec 2018). This is very often used by
alternative media as well as various hoaxes and chain e-mails. These alternative media play a
critical role in preparing the audience for securitization. The role of media in creating images
of migrants in Central and East European societies would be a topic sufficient for another thesis
or maybe even a book. This has even a geopolitical dimension, as according to a report of Czech
internal intelligence service, many of these alternative media servers are funded by Russia (BIS
2018). A large part of the media is also owned by the prime minister’s trust fund.
The combination of feeling left out, lack of ability to critically assess information and the
general disappointment with the post-1989 development offers demand for protection. And
many politicians are happy to provide the supply of protection promises. Migration and
Islamophobia supported by some of the media open great potential for those who are willing to
use fear in order to gain support.

9.3 Securitization-motivated voting
This part of Balzacq’s three-dimensional analysis is the most difficult one to prove. As shown
in the graph below, there is no clear pattern that would prove causality between securitization
and election success.
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Graph 11: Frequency of securitization and election results
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There are additional factors necessary to add to the picture. Mainly the previously mentioned
factors of age, education and unemployment. According to research conducted by the Czech
TV, the party with most young voters were Pirates. The older generations were more frequently
in favour of the Communist party or ANO. People with lower levels of education often voted
for ČSSD, KSČM and ANO. In towns and cities with high unemployment rates preferred ANO,
SPD and KSČM (ČT 2019a).
When looking at the graph, the parties on the right side (with a higher frequency of
securitization statements) were favoured by older people, those living in towns and cities with
above-average unemployment rates and with lower education. Precisely the same groups of
people are more vulnerable to disinformation, and in previous chapters, these people are less
open to Muslims and migrants in general. This is not enough to establish a causality link, but
the correlation across this many factors is very unlikely to be coincidental.
The research questions stated at the beginning of the thesis can be, therefore answered in the
following way:
Q1a: To what extent was the securitization process adjusted to a contextual frame?
The securitization statements chosen by the securitizing actors were adjusted to the contextual
frame mainly by using the sovereignty theme. The frequently repeated statements of assurance
of national sovereignty and unwillingness to let others decide on behalf of Czech citizens was
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a common feature. This was very often linked to migration and highlighting the rhetoric of “no
one will tell us who will live and work here”. The contextual frame is likely to be connected
with the historical memory of the nation and the sensitivity towards external threats.
Q1b: To what extent was securitization of migration audience-oriented?
The orientation on the audience is closely related to the context. Many of the researched parties
used the rhetoric of external danger and offered protection, in some cases against anything that
might be perceived as danger. In order to support their arguments, parties used images of
dangerous migrants or dozens of millions of migrants. The language of protection aimed at
vulnerable social groups who are more likely to get influenced by misinformation and have
limited access to independent information, are less educated and in general not happy with their
livelihood. These social groups very often preferred parties who used securitization incentives
more often.
Q1c: Were the securitizing actors able to use their rhetoric in order to win the support of the
target audience for political purposes?
While there is no proof of direct causality, the groups that are less open to migration and
Muslims more often voted for parties with higher securitization frequency.
Q1: In the cases of selected relevant political parties, was securitization of migration in their
parties manifestos for the European Parliament Election of May 2019 effective, using what
means?
Firstly, it is important to realize that not all relevant political parties used securitization
statements in their manifestos. Pirates and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) did not use
any. While Pirates increased their preferences significantly, compared to previous elections,
Christian democrats did lose approximately 3 % compared to the 2014 election. On the other
hand, the Social Democrats used securitization statements and did not gain a single mandate in
the new term of the European Parliament. The election was a success for relatively new parties
out of which many used securitization statements.
Generally speaking, parties who used securitization were successful in gaining support from
groups who were likely to agree to securitization. On the other hand, the election has been a
witness to a rather deepening generation gap divided by the year 1989. Mainly second party
system parties were able to gain positive results. In other words, securitization, in general, was
effective, yet other factors played an important role – the most important one was which party
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is going to successfully address the target population, which is securitization-ready. In this case,
the Social Democrats lost.
The most common means of securitization of migration were the context in which was
securitization used, such as associating it with terrorism; the statements on migration
themselves portrayed migration as a dangerous and undesirable phenomenon, and in many
cases, there was an emphasis on stopping and preventing migration using security measures.
Last but not least, the message of securitization was the objective of the second research
question.
Q2: What was the message contained in the statements which were identified as securitizing
migration?
There were three main levels of message identified in the party manifestos regarding
securitization. First one is the context. Regardless of the positivity or negativity of the
statements on migration, the issue of migration was very often raised in chapters devoted to
security. Migration was often referred to in the context of criminal activities such as terrorism,
trafficking or organized crime. This itself could be identified as a securitizing speech act.
On the second level, migration was often used with negative attributes. Main ones being illegal,
the migrant crisis, migrant wave. This creates a notion of migration as undesired, threatening
and overwhelming.
The third level was the analysis of individual statements. In general, these statements were
focused on solving migration by stopping it and preventing it. Some of the statements were
explicitly focused on Muslim migrants, portraying them as criminal, others overestimated the
numbers of migrants.
The overall message was that it is necessary to deal with illegal, dangerous migration which is
often associated with terrorism and violence. The general notion is that migration is negative,
needs to be stopped and solved.
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Conclusion
Securitization of migration in the Czech Republic is a topic that has not been researched to this
extent. The findings of the research above show that securitization of migration is just a part of
a much bigger picture. This picture involves peripherality, feeling of uncertainty, vulnerability
and lack of knowledge. It shares many common features with other Eastern and Central
European countries because the significant factor played in the vulnerability to securitization is
the historical development which is to a greater extent shared mainly with the other Visegrad
group countries.
The securitization of migration, as shown in this context, paints the image of millions of
migrants who are dangerous and willing to get into Europe. The migration movements, which
are decreasing in the last years since 2015, never directly influenced the Czech Republic. There
was no migration wave, no Africans and Arabs flooded the country as some of the politicians
predicted. However, four years after the peak of the migration movements, migration remains
a very sensitive issue for particular groups of people.
Regardless of the actual decreasing number of migrants arriving in Europe, migration is still
used in the election campaign as a scarecrow for many. It was presented in what ways are
migrants portrayed and in what context is migration usually put. And as has been shown, using
migration to induce fear works in a country without any migration waves or crises.
Fear of migration, besides becoming one of the main issues of the pre-election campaign, is a
symptom of a deeply rooted problem of East and Central Europe which will become more
apparent in the years to come. The way in which politicians use the abovementioned
vulnerabilities is the most challenging issue. By appealing to insecurity, they reinforce it,
creating a vicious cycle. By securitizing migration as an external threat from outside, but also
negatively labelling those, who support migration, the politicians artificially deepen the
cleavages in today’s society. Using fear and fuelling this fear in exchange for support is both
dangerous and short-sighted.
Migration was picked as a widespread securitizing issue by most of the analysed parties. But
why is it that migration was a favourite choice? This thesis mentioned that people who are in
general less open to migration share several common features, being it the age, education,
unemployment etc. Another rather important factor is also the lack of knowledge of foreigners.
It can be assumed, based on previous analysis, that migration is rather easy to be securitized in
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the Czech context from two fundamental reasons – many people do not know anyone personally
from different cultural background, and therefore it is easy to fill in the blanks with negative
images of foreigners. Secondly, migration being a trans-national issue, it is also relatively easy
to connect migration and the EU. In this case, again, many politicians count on the fact that the
general knowledge on how the EU works and interest in the EU is somewhat low. Migration is
almost a textbook example of securitizing an issue by using the lack of knowledge.
While this thesis dealt primarily with theories, manifestos and proclamations, there is a growing
number of cases where securitization of migration actually has policy-impact. Just a few days
before finalizing this thesis it was discovered by Czech journalists that in September 2019 the
Greek Minister for Citizens’ Protection wrote a letter to Czech Minister of Interior Jan
Hamáček, asking him urgently for accepting a relocation of 40 children from Greek refugee
camps (Engelová 2019). Not only did the Czech Ministry of Interior not informed the public
about this letter, the Minister of Interior ignored the proposal, but when the journalists informed
about it, he Tweeted that he does not “(…) see any sense in relocating 17-year-old with no right
of asylum around Europe.” (Hamáček 2019) This is an example of how securitization of
migration can actually produce policies which are not even anti-migrant rather than antihumanitarian.

65

Bibliography
Ágh, Attila. 2018. ‘EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL EUROPEANIZATION IN EASTCENTRAL EUROPE: THE NEW POPULIST PARTIES AND DECONSOLIDATION IN
THE 2010S’. Journal of Comparative Politics 11: 12–32.
Aktualne.cz. 2019. ‘“První Český Terorista” Balda Vyšší Trest Nedostane, Žalobce o to v
Odvolání Nežádá’. Aktualne.Cz. 26 February 2019. https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/prvnicesky-terorista-balda-vyssi-trest-u-odvolaciho-soudun/r~c9d6254a39d511e9b6a9ac1f6b220ee8/.
Andersson, Ruben. 2017. ‘Rescued and Caught’. In The Borders of ‘Europe’, edited by
Nicholas De Genova. Durham: Duke University Press.
Bakewell, Oliver. 2008. ‘“Keeping Them in Their Place”: The Ambivalent Relationship
between Development and Migration in Africa’. Third World Quarterly 29 (7): 1341–58.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802386492.
Balzacq, Thierry. 2005. ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and
Context’. European Journal of International Relations 11 (2): 171–201.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052960.
BBC. 2015. ‘Migrant Crisis: One Million Enter Europe in 2015’. BBC News. 22 December
2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35158769.
———. 2019. ‘Why Is This Billionaire a Bogeyman for the Hard Right?’ BBC News, 7
September 2019, sec. Stories. https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-49584157.
BIS. 2018. ‘Annual Report of the Security Information Service for 2017’. Prague: BIS.
https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocni-zpravy/en/ar2017en.pdf.
Brodcová, Daniela, and Ondřej Golis. 2019. ‘‚Konečně Jim to Někdo Vrátil, Ne?‘ Vypátrali
Jsme Autory Komentářů Schvalujících Útok Na Novém Zélandu’. IROZHLAS. 24 March
2019. https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/christchurch-nenavistne-komentare-internetpolicie-socialni-site_1903241700_dbr.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for
Analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

66

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for
Analysis. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers.
Carling, Jørgen, and María Hernández-Carretero. 2011. ‘Protecting Europe and Protecting
Migrants? Strategies for Managing Unauthorised Migration from Africa’. The British Journal
of Politics and International Relations 13 (1): 42–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467856X.2010.00438.x.
Červenka, Jan. 2019. ‘Důvěra stranickým představitelům – září 2019’. Prague: CVVM.
https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a5007/f9/pi191004.pdf.
CSO. 2019. ‘Cizinci podle státního občanství, věku a pohlaví’. Cizinci podle státního
občanství, věku a pohlaví. 12 July 2019. https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/cizinci-podle-statnihoobcanstvi-veku-a-pohlavi.
ČSÚ. 2014. ‘Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu Konané Na Území České Republiky ve
Dnech 23.05. – 24.05.2014’. 2014. https://volby.cz/pls/ep2014/ep11?xjazyk=CZ.
———. 2017. ‘Volby Do Poslanecké Sněmovny Parlamentu České Republiky Konané ve
Dnech 20.10. – 21.10.2017 (Promítnuto Usnesení NSS)’. 2017.
https://volby.cz/pls/ps2017nss/ps2?xjazyk=CZ.
———. 2019. ‘Volby Do Evropského Parlamentu Konané Na Území České Republiky ve
Dnech 24.05. – 25.05.2019’. Volby.Cz. 2019. https://volby.cz/pls/ep2019/ep11?xjazyk=CZ.
ČT. 2019a. ‘ANALÝZA: ANO bodovalo v obcích s vysokou nezaměstnaností, lidovci u
věřících’. ČT24 - Nejdůvěryhodnější zpravodajský web v ČR - Česká televize. 25 May 2019.
https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/specialy/volby-do-evropskeho-parlamentu-2019/2825504analyza-ano-bodovalo-v-obcich-s-vysokou.
———. 2019b. ‘Zeman ústavu porušuje dlouhodobě, je tu malá normalizace, míní politolog
Lebeda’. ČT24 - Nejdůvěryhodnější zpravodajský web v ČR - Česká televize. 1 September
2019. https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/2912552-zeman-ustavu-porusuje-dlouhodobe-jetu-mala-normalizace-mini-politolog-lebeda.
ČT24. 2019. ‘Nastražení Stromů Před Vlaky Byl Terorismus, Rozhodl Soud. Senior Dostal
Čtyři Roky’. ČT24. 14 January 2019. https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/2704997nastrazeni-stromu-pred-vlaky-byl-terorismus-rozhodl-soud-senior-dostal-ctyri-roky.

67

ČTK. 2019. ‘Policie Prověřuje Případné Schvalování Teroru Na Novém Zélandu’. ČTK. 16
March 2019. https://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/policie-proveruje-pripadne-schvalovaniteroru-na-novem-zelandu/1733743.
CZ Government. 2013. ‘Vietnamská národnostní menšina | Vláda ČR’. 17 July 2013.
https://www.vlada.cz/cz/ppov/rnm/mensiny/vietnamska-mensina-108870/.
De Genova, Nicholas. 2017. ‘The Borders of “Europe” and the European Question’. In The
Borders of ‘Europe’, edited by Nicholas De Genova. Durham: Duke University Press.
Dražanová, Lenka. 2018. ‘Immigration and the Czech Presidential Election’. LSE Blog. 25
January 2018. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/01/25/immigration-and-the-czechpresidential-election/.
Echo24. 2016. ‘Duka: Mlčet či lhát? Civilizační sebevražda. Islám má násilné tendence Echo24.cz’. 6 August 2016. //echo24.cz/a/wNJz3/duka-mlcet-ci-lhat-civilizacni-sebevrazdaislam-ma-nasilne-tendence.
Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2013. ‘Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One
Hundred Years On’. East European Politics and Societies 27 (1): 90–107.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325412465310.
Elahi, Farah, and Omar Khan. 2017. ‘Introduction: What Is Islamophobia?’ In Islamophobia:
Still a Challenge for Us All, edited by Farah Elahi and Omar Khan, Runnymede. London.
https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf.
Engelová, Tereza. 2019. ‘Přijměte Čtyřicet Dětských Uprchlíků, Vyzvalo Řecko Už v Září
Prahu. Ministerstvo Vnitra Bez Reakce — HlídacíPes.Org’. HlídacíPes.Org. 6 November
2019. https://hlidacipes.org/prijmete-ctyricet-detskych-uprchliku-vyzvalo-recko-v-zari-prahuministerstvo-vnitra-o-prosbe-mlci/.
European Commission. 2018. ‘PublicOpinion - European Commission’. Public Opinion.
November 2018.
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/59/gro
upKy/279.
Eurostat. 2019. ‘Migration and Migrant Population Statistics - Statistics Explained’. 2019.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics.
68

Forbes. 2019. ‘100 nejbohatších Čechů 2019’. 100 nejbohatších Čechů 2019. 2019.
https://miliardari.forbes.cz/.
Gamso, Jonas, and Farhod Yuldashev. 2018. ‘Does Rural Development Aid Reduce
International Migration?’ World Development 110 (October): 268–82.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.05.035.
Goździak, Elżbieta M., and Péter Márton. 2018. ‘Where the Wild Things Are: Fear of Islam
and the Anti-Refugee Rhetoric in Hungary and in Poland’. Central and Eastern European
Migration Review, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.17467/ceemr.2018.04.
Hamáček, Jan. 2019. ‘Jan Hamacek Twitter’. Twitter. 7 November 2019.
https://twitter.com/jhamacek/status/1192456007114465282.
Hannová, Daniela. 2013. Arabští Studenti v Praze v Padesátých a Šedesátých Letech 20.
Století. Charles University. Prague. https://is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/download/120127615.
———. 2014. ‘Problémoví elegáni. Arabští studenti v Praze v 50. a 60. letech 20. století’.
Acta Universitatis Carolinae 54 (2): 21.
https://www.cupress.cuni.cz/ink2_stat/dload.jsp?prezMat=90879.
Hanzlová, Radka. 2019a. ‘Zájem o politiku a názory na podílení se občanů na rozhodování únor 2019’. CVVM.
http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4872/f9/pd190307.pdf.
———. 2019b. ‘Postoj české veřejnosti k přijímání uprchlíků – květen 2019’. Prague:
CVVM.
https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4966/f9/pm190626.pdf.
Havlík, Vlastimil. 2019a. ‘Technocratic Populism and Political Illiberalism in Central
Europe’. Problems of Post-Communism 0 (0): 1–16.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2019.1580590.
———. 2019b. ‘No Country for Old Parties’. In The European Parliament Elections of 2019,
edited by Lorenzo De Sio, Mark N. Franklin, and Luana Russo. Rome: Luiss University
Press. https://cise.luiss.it/cise/2019/06/26/the-european-parliament-elections-of-2019-the-ebook/?fbclid=IwAR3zFsMVw2OjTcimi2_HvJiojlEYU3nSg8KAbcNt69aD08SzhNxqsGRRjA.

69

Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang, and Sarah E. Shannon. 2005. ‘Three Approaches to Qualitative Content
Analysis’. Qualitative Health Research 15 (9): 1277–88.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687.
Huysmans, Jef. 2011. ‘What’s in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security
Nothings’. Security Dialogue 42 (4–5): 371–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418713.
iDnes. 2017. ‘Lidl Čelí Kritice Rasistů Kvůli Černochovi v Letáku. Ustupovat Nehodlá’.
IDNES.Cz. 4 January 2017. https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/lidl-reklamni-letak-cernochrasiste-facebook.A170104_102151_domaci_jw.
iROZHLAS. 2018a. ‘Babiš: Proč bychom přijímali syrské sirotky? Máme je i u nás a musíme
je připravit na vstup do života’. iROZHLAS. 15 September 2018.
https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/andrej-babis-sirotci-syrie_1809151129_pj.
———. 2018b. ‘Europoslankyně Šojdrová o pomoci syrským sirotkům: Není to populistické
gesto, lidé nevnímají, že jde o děti’. iROZHLAS. 17 September 2018.
https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/syrie-siroty-prijeti-michaela-sojdrova-andrejbabis_1809171938_mos.
———. 2019. ‘Bylo za socialismu lépe? Více než třetina Čechů v průzkumu uvedla, že ano’.
iROZHLAS. 22 October 2019. https://www.irozhlas.cz/zivotni-styl/spolecnost/pruzkumpamet-naroda-cesko-listopad-1989-sametova-revoluce-komunismus_1910221000_dok.
Kalmar, Ivan. 2018. ‘“The Battlefield Is in Brussels”: Islamophobia in the Visegrád Four in
Its Global Context’. Patterns of Prejudice 52 (5): 406–19.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2018.1512473.
Karlík, Martin, and Dominika Kubištová. 2019. ‘‚Pro Mě Nepřijatelné.‘ Hamáček Vyzval
Policii, Aby Dohlédla Na Nenávistné Komentáře o Christchurchi | IROZHLAS - Spolehlivé
Zprávy’. IROZHLAS. 16 March 2019. https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/jan-hamacekministr-vnitra-christchurch-nenavistne-komentare-policie_1903161251_dok.
Křížek, Daniel. 2017. ‘Vývoj západních představ o islámu a muslimech: O stereotypech a
předsudcích’. In Islamofobie po česku, edited by Bronislav Ostřanský. Prague: Vyšehrad.
Kuras, Benjamin. 2012. Soumrak bílého muže.
Lidovky.cz. 2018. ‘VIDEO: ‚Kolik vám je let, chlapče.‘ Faltýnek se pustil do Piráta Michálka
kvůli Čapímu hnízdu | Domov’. Lidovky.cz. 2 July 2018.
70

https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/video-kolik-vam-je-let-chlapce-faltynek-se-pustil-do-piratamichalka-kvuli-capimu-hnizdu.A180702_111714_ln_domov_rsa.
McKeon, Nora. 2018. ‘“Getting to the Root Causes of Migration” in West Africa – Whose
History, Framing and Agency Counts?’ Globalizations 15 (6): 870–85.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2018.1503842.
MEDIAN. 2018. ‘Vztah a Znalosti Čechů k Muslimské Minoritě’. June.
http://www.median.eu/cs/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Vztah_a_zanlosti_Cechu_k_muslimske_minorite_web.pdf.
Mendel, Miloš. 2006. ‘Muslimové v Českých Zemích 1934-1989’. Dingir 2006 (1).
http://dingir.cz/archiv/Dingir106.pdf#page=16.
Miholjcic, Nina. 2017. ‘The Securitization of Migration Issue: Hungarian Case’. Journal of
Community Positive Practices XVII (3): 10.
Němcová, Barbora, and Martina Heroldová. 2017. ‘Vlak Narazil Do Stromu, Našli Tam
Vzkaz Alláh Je Velký. Provokace, Nebo Pokus o Teror, Říká Chovanec’. Aktualne.Cz. 1 June
2017. https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/na-mladoboleslavsku-havaroval-vlak-po-srazce-sestromem-jet/r~d53af49446b911e783fe002590604f2e/?_ga=2.33038718.1120838921.1496320426223275352.1486710846.
Odell, John. 2001. Case Study Methods in International Political Economy. Vol. 2.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1528-3577.00047.
Ostřanský, Bronislav. 2017a. ‘Islám se vkrádá do našich obýváků’. In Islamofobie po česku,
edited by Bronislav Ostřanský. Prague: Vyšehrad.
———. 2017b. ‘Islamofobie jako koncept i kolbiště’. In Islamofobie po česku, edited by
Bronislav Ostřanský. Prague: Vyšehrad.
People in Need. 2017. ‘Asylum Seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection in V4
Countries’. People in Need. https://www.clovekvtisni.cz/media/publications/876/file/v4niemrepot-cz-hu-pl-sk-complete.pdf.
Pew Research Center. 2017. ‘Muslims Make up 4.9% of Europe’s Population in 2016’. 22
November 2017. https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslimpopulation/pf_11-29-17_muslims-update-20/.
71

Programy do Voleb. 2019a. ‘Program ANO’. Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019 Programy do voleb. 2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/.
———. 2019b. ‘Program ČSSD’. Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019 - Programy do
voleb. 2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/.
———. 2019c. ‘Program KDU-ČSL’. Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019 - Programy do
voleb. 2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/.
———. 2019d. ‘Program KSČM’. Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019 - Programy do
voleb. 2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/.
———. 2019e. ‘Program ODS’. Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019 - Programy do
voleb. 2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/.
———. 2019f. ‘Program Piráti’. Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019 - Programy do
voleb. 2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/.
———. 2019g. ‘Program SPD’. Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019 - Programy do voleb.
2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/.
———. 2019h. ‘Program Svobodní’. Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019 - Programy do
voleb. 2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/.
———. 2019i. ‘Program TOP09+STAN’. Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019 - Programy
do voleb. 2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/.
———. 2019j. ‘Seznam stran a hnutí ve volbách do EP’. Seznam stran a hnutí ve volbách do
EP. 7 April 2019. https://eu2019.programydovoleb.cz/kandidujici-strany-a-hnuti.
Romea.cz. 2019. ‘Desítky Komentářů, ve Kterých Pisatelé Schvalují Neonacistický Útok Na
Novém Zélandu. Policie Prý Už Koná - Romea.Cz’. Romea.Cz. 16 March 2019.
http://www.romea.cz/cz/zpravodajstvi/domaci/desitky-komentaru-kde-pisatele-schvalujineonacisticky-utok-na-novem-zelandu.policie-pry-uz-kona.
Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1993. ‘Social Construction of Target Populations:
Implications for Politics and Policy’. American Political Science Review 87 (2): 334–47.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2939044.

72

Šimoník, Pavel, and Jan Burianec. 2018. ‘Mediální gramotnost’. Stem Mark.
https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/sites/default/files/2221556vyzkum_mg_konferencemsmt_ct_fin.pdf.
Štampach, Ivan. 2017. ‘Motivace islamofobních (antiislamistických) postojů zejména v České
republice a přínost religionistiky k jejich analýze’. In Islamofobie po česku, edited by
Bronislav Ostřanský. Prague: Vyšehrad.
The Economist. 2019. ‘The Migration Crisis’. The Economist. 2019.
https://www.economist.com/migrationcrisis.
Tsourapas, Gerasimos. 2019. ‘How Migration Deals Lead to Refugee Commodification’.
News Deeply. 13 February 2019.
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2019/02/13/how-migration-deals-lead-torefugee-commodification.
Tuček, Milan. 2019. ‘Vztah české veřejnosti k národnostním skupinám žijícím v ČR – březen
2019’. CVVM.
https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/index.php?option=com_finder&view=search&Itemid=250&lang=cz&
q=%22NS_1903%22.
UN. 2017. ‘Population Facts’. December 2017.
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/popfacts/PopFacts_201
7-5.pdf.
UNHCR. 2018. ‘Refugees and Migrants Arrivals to Europe in 2018’. UN High Commissioner
for Refugees. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68006.pdf.
World Bank. 2019. ‘International Migrant Stock (% of Population)’. 2019.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL.ZS?end=2018&start=1960.
Zvada, Ľubomír. 2018. ‘Securitization of the Migration Crisis and Islamophobic Rhetoric:
The 2016 Slovak Parliamentary Elections as a Case Study’. Journal of Nationalism, Memory
& Language Politics 12 (2): 216–35. https://doi.org/10.2478/jnmlp-2018-0010.

73

